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Executive summary 
 
This is the first community-level participatory research endeavour with poor and excluded groups since 
the peace process. It focuses on grassroots experiences and understandings of governance and 
citizenship, and the implications thereof for state building in post-conflict Nepal. Many of the findings 
about poor people’s priorities and blockages in the system are consistent with earlier participatory 
research undertaken during the decade-long Nepal Communist Party (NCP) insurgency (NEPAN, 1999, 
ActionAid 2004) and also with several more recent qualitative research initiatives (GSEA 2005, UNDP 
2006). On the one hand, these commonalities should be seen in a positive light as they represent the 
development of a growing body of evidence that lends support to a range of policy recommendations 
aimed at tackling poverty and social exclusion. On the other, they should be viewed with concern and 
urgently addressed, as it suggests that many of the original sources of the conflict remain unresolved.  
 
It is important to emphasise that although this study included some poverty assessment components, 
its primary emphasis was on governance and state-citizen relations. The study’s starting point was a 
conviction that a more nuanced understanding of how poor and excluded groups interact with the state 
has much to offer policy makers and development practitioners interested in questions of state building 
and governance, especially in the context of a fragile peace. How do poor people understand 
citizenship, how do they experience and practise it, what barriers do they face and how do they think 
these could be overcome? It also explores poor and excluded groups’ vision for a New Nepal following 
Jana Andolan 2 (the People’s Movement 2), the November 2006 peace agreement and the emergence of 
the democratically elected government in May 2008.    
 
Findings that are consistent with earlier work include:  
 
• Addressing deeply entrenched social hierarchies (caste, ethnicity, gender, class) is an important 
priority for poor and excluded groups, as social exclusion is an important impediment to poverty 
alleviation and political representation.  
• Community user groups constitute one avenue to increase the representation of poor and 
excluded groups’ voices in local policy processes, but there are also important limitations 
(especially representation in decision-making roles) and the danger of elite capture that need to 
be creatively addressed. 
• Important impediments in poor and excluded groups accessing services include both demand 
and supply side factors. On the supply side, they are expected to pay for services that are 
supposed to be ‘free’, find limited presence of qualified service providers in rural villages, and 
delayed service. Language presents another barrier for the illiterate and for those whose mother 
tongue is not Nepali.  On the demand side, community disunity and a failure to understand that 
the new language of citizen’s rights also entails citizen responsibilities are important obstacles 
to collective action approaches to poverty reduction.  
• Age specific concerns merit greater policy attention. On the one hand, there is a serious lack of 
employment opportunities, especially for youth in rural Nepal, thus accounting for high rates of 
international labour migration, including among the poorest communities. On the other hand, in 
poor and excluded communities, the elderly are often especially vulnerable, and thus value 
access to senior citizen and widow pensions. 
• Regional inequalities and geographical isolation heighten poor and excluded groups’ 
experiences of poverty, and were intensified during the conflict as less developed areas became 
more insecure. This is especially the case in the Far West, mountainous regions and rural cf. 
urban communities, suggesting that geography constitutes a critical part of many people’s 
experience of poverty.    
 
Findings that are either new or emerged particularly clearly in this study include the following:  
 
 
 
 
 viii
I.  Strong support for peace 
 
• There is very strong support for peace among poor and excluded communities, regardless of 
their experiences during and views of the decade-long conflict. Poor and excluded groups are 
not calling for revenge, retaliation or even transitional justice, but rather for sustainable peace 
and renewed development efforts. 
• Urban communities and some Terai communities are less optimistic than rural communities 
about the peace process, and are particularly concerned about the potential for violence, 
especially in eastern Terai.   
• Although concerned about the fragility of the current peace process, due to very negative 
experiences with security forces during the insurgency, few communities were demanding 
greater police presence and a number of communities were categorically opposed to bringing 
police closer to their villages. Exceptions included some urban communities and villages where 
young men had returned from the army or Maoist forces and were struggling to reintegrate into 
the community.  
• Consultation processes between government and citizens such as this research study generated 
considerable enthusiasm. Many poor and excluded groups emphasised that they had not 
previously been consulted by government (in this case the National Planning Commission), but 
that they were eager to contribute to dialogues on restructuring the state.  
• Although levels of awareness about current state restructuring efforts were relatively low, 
especially among Dalit communities and women, many participants expressed an interest and 
willingness to be involved in the process of restructuring the state, but complained about a lack 
of information and absence of awareness-raising/educational initiatives at the village level.   
 
II. Support for strengthening meaningful decentralisation 
 
• There is strong support among poor and excluded groups for greater decentralisation (more 
substantive local decision-making and budgetary resources), but also an awareness that this 
will need to be balanced by a strong yet accountable central government to prevent political 
fragmentation.  
• Despite myriad criticisms of the state and of specific government agencies, poor people 
nevertheless have frequent interactions with a considerable number of government agencies. 
Moreover, they maintain surprisingly high expectations of government, and specifically of the 
Village Development Committee.   
• The importance of access to information – a major component of poor people’s sense of social 
exclusion is based on their lack of access to information about entitlements, services, 
procedures to access the resources available through new projects, opportunities for civic 
participation, avenues through which to channel demands for change, legal rights and political 
reforms. There is a strong sense that local elites control information flows (especially district 
level vis-à-vis village level governments) in order to maintain their positions of power. Improving 
communication channels between government officials and service providers on the one hand, 
and citizens, on the other, emerged as a critical first step in strengthening citizen-state 
relations, and reducing elite capture of incoming resources and opportunity.  
• Although there are more than four hundred thousand community user groups in Nepal, their 
coverage in very poor communities is low, and participation of women and Dalits in such 
committees even lower.  
 
III. Limited presence of non-state organisations 
 
• There was very limited donor and NGO presence in the study communities, as evidenced by the 
low levels of reliance on non-state organisations. This suggests that many poverty alleviation 
efforts are not reaching the poorest. It also highlights the urgency of improving programme 
design and targeting, as well as improving aid effectiveness and accountability in Nepal more 
generally.  
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• Private sector presence was extremely limited (even in urban areas), and was underscored by a 
high demand for employment opportunities, but perception that these would either be in the 
form of self-employment options or government jobs.  
 
IV. Experiences of social exclusion are complex and multi-layered 
 
• Poor and excluded groups are not habituated to social exclusion, domination and injustice. 
Rather they have developed coping strategies to deal with exploitative and unequal power 
relations in their daily lives, as very limited alternatives largely preclude risk-taking actions. 
Addressing caste, ethnic, gender, regional and economic inequalities is seen as an important 
priority by poor people: being treated with respect and dignity would significantly lessen their 
sense of exclusion and make a significant contribution to their experience of well-being. 
• In order to address the multi-layered power inequalities (class, caste, ethnicity, gender) that 
many poor people identify as major impediments to improving their quality of life, a common 
policy priority that emerged was for awareness raising and civic education initiatives. Poor 
people emphasised that it would be important to direct these efforts not only for those who face 
discrimination, but especially to those who benefit from systems of dominance and injustice – 
men, the wealthy, ‘upper caste’ groups.  
• Although practices of gender discrimination are multiple and well-known in Nepal, the 
significant finding from this study was the recognition by most women and also significant 
numbers of men of the problems stemming from unequal power relations between men and 
women, boys and girls. Existing gender differences were not seen as natural and acceptable, but 
rather important to address in order to tackle household and community poverty.   
• The importance of awareness raising/educational initiatives and joint community dialogues on 
issues of inequality and discrimination was further reinforced by the observation that patterns 
of caste and gender discrimination were partially reverting after the exit of the Maoists from 
many communities since the April 2006 People’s Movement. This suggests that behavioural 
change is only likely to be sustainable if accompanied by changes in attitudes and values.1   
• Priorities and concerns of poor Janajati communities are highly varied and there is no common 
pan-Janajati sense of identity. However, there were clear signs of increased debate and 
organising around these issues as evidenced by the number of ethnic, political and non-political 
groups formed in research sites since the peace process.    
• Poor Bahun, Chhetri and Yadav (Terai middle caste) communities expressed a strong sense of 
social exclusion – both because of cleavages within their own community between ‘the cunning’ 
and ‘the simple’, and because of a perception that they are being excluded from development 
programmes, which are largely targeted at Dalits and Janajatis. This not only suggests that 
income poverty should be included as an important eligibility criteria for development 
programmes, but that efforts to communicate the rationale behind affirmative action measures 
to address caste, ethnicity and gender-based social exclusion will also be important if the 
government and other development actors are to minimise a sense of resentment among other 
groups and address possible sources of tension/conflict.   
• Poor people from religious minorities (Buddhist, Muslim, Christian) have yet to experience the 
benefits of Nepal government’s declaration of a secular state in 2006, including equitable 
access to public funding for religious facilities. This study suggested that poor Muslim 
communities are especially vulnerable, experiencing multiple and overlapping sources of social 
and economic exclusion. Moreover, the study’s research findings suggest that religious tensions 
exist beneath the surface in parts of Nepali society and that there is thus a need for more 
research and sensitive monitoring of this situation as well as policy efforts to promote greater 
social inclusion.   
 
 
 
                                                          
1  Interestingly, this reversion was predicted in the DFID sponsored study of ‘Conflict and Social Change’ carried out in 2003 
during one of the cease fire periods.    
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V. Poor people’s priorities are largely context-specific  
 
• Poor people’s priorities were first and foremost context-specific, suggesting that local level 
decision-making is critical to ensure that people’s development priorities are effectively met.  
• Important caste differences, however, emerged in terms of poor people’s priorities – whereas 
poor people overall emphasised roads, education and health services and employment 
opportunities, the most important concerns among Dalit communities were land insecurity and 
lack of access to water.  
• Lack of land title and landlessness cannot be ignored. They constitute major grievances, 
especially among excluded groups who tend to view the CPN Maoists more favourably. This 
points to an urgent need for meaningful land reform.     
• Connectivity, including better roads, accessible and affordable telecommunications and reliable 
postal services, also emerged as an important priority, highlighting the fact that geographical 
isolation constitutes a critical part of many people’s experience of poverty.   
• Lack of access to services emerged as an important concern, but was not limited to access to 
education and health services, but rather encompassed a wider range of services including 
access to drinking water, sanitation, veterinary, agricultural extension, vocational skills training, 
electricity and credit/financial services. Poor people commonly felt that their limited access to 
these services stemmed from their lack of education, poverty, low political and social standing, 
geographical isolation and lack of access to timely information. 
• The area in which poor people regardless of caste/ethnicity/gender/ geography/ religion feel 
most excluded is access to formal justice. This goes beyond the problems of discriminatory laws 
or weak law enforcement to a more profound sense of lack of awareness and lack of confidence 
that poor people would be able to access legal redress.  
 
VI. Border issues – opportunities and risks 
 
• Remittances from migrants to India (and to the Persian Gulf) play an important role in supporting 
household livelihood security, and do not seem to be diminishing following the peace process. 
Although communities reported that male relatives were returning home more frequently 
following the conflict, few were staying permanently due a persistent lack of local employment 
opportunities.  
• Cross-border migration also emerged as an important influence in terms of social and political 
learning. Caste cleavages were more easily overcome when living abroad, and understandings 
of alternative governance systems were often based on observations of Indian federalism, 
targeted development programmes and state subsidies. There were also significant cross-
border ties among some Hindu and Muslim communities, including financing of religious 
institutions and exchange of religious teachers.  
• The open border with India provides economic and marriage market opportunities for poor and 
excluded communities but the benefits are mixed. Although cheaper goods can be purchased in 
India, small-scale Nepali merchants are often subject to bribe-taking by border officials and also 
struggle to compete with larger Indian competitors in Nepali markets. India provides a large and 
more lucrative marriage market for Nepali families, but some families expressed concerns about 
being unable to meet increased dowry expenses and supervise the treatment of their daughters 
by foreign parents-in-laws.   
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1. Introduction  
 
‘Effective states and better governance are essential to combat poverty. States which respect civil 
liberties and are accountable to their citizens are more stable, which in turn means they are more likely 
to attract investment and generate long term economic growth….[Conversely,] poor governance breeds 
disillusionment, grievances and conflict’ (UK DFID White Paper, 2006: 46). 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Latent and violent unrest has plagued Nepal since the process of parliamentary politics was re-
introduced in 1991 after 50 years of monarchical rule. The multi-party system emerged out of 
widespread protests, popularly known as the ‘Jana Andolan’ (People’s Movement), after growing 
dissatisfaction with the party-less ‘Panchayat’ system. These grievances were based on the systematic 
failure of government structures to adequately represent a highly diverse population based on varying 
regional, religious, caste and cultural identity issues, underlying all of which was the tension created by 
a narrative promoting national homogenisation toward Hindu values. 
 
The reforms introduced by the new congress in the early 1990s, however, coincided with an economic 
crisis, a deepening dependency on foreign assistance and a continued fragmentation of national 
identities. In 1992 a Joint People’s Agitation Committee was formulated by a number of groups to 
impose strikes and apply pressure for stabilising policies but violent clashes and a failure to introduce 
promised land reforms served to further radicalise much of the population.2  
 
In 1996, unmet expectations led to a civil war as the Communist Party – Maoist (CPM), a splinter of the 
Communist Unity Centre, bid to introduce a socialist republic. The ensuing conflict lasted ten years and 
claimed 13 000 lives. It also had a devastating effect on following infrastructure and the economy, 
including the country’s large tourism sector and development programmes. During the conflict, civil 
liberties became increasingly restricted, and the government refused to conduct elections for a 
constituent assembly. In 2002 and 2005 the monarchy reassumed itself in order to control the peace 
process and confront increasing Maoist threats. In contrast to previous efforts, an agreement on a 
gradual path to democratisation between the CPM and the United People’s Front was finally secured in 
2005. In addition, a deal allowing the Maoists to take part in governance processes under conditions of 
UN weapons monitoring was concluded with the Nepali Congress Party in 2006. These shifts were 
partly influenced by a significant groundswell of activity in civil society, known as the Jana Andolan 2 
(the 2nd People’s Movement), in 2006.  
 
Given this background, it is notable that Nepal is now entering a new phase of constitutional 
development and experiencing an emerging peace process.  Where government services had previously 
been limited in reach by lack of access to non-urban areas due to ongoing armed rebellion by the 
Maoist guerrilla army (except for funding to health and education institutions), the ‘People’s Movement 
2’ has heralded in significant change, with high public expectations and a strengthened public 
willingness to protest against perceived government failure and human rights abuses. The movement 
has brought a renewed commitment to democracy—but in a context where principles of participation, 
accountability and transparency remain weak and where the emphasis on citizen rights has not been 
balanced by a sense of citizen responsibility.  
 
However, the movement has highlighted the persistence of social exclusion in a political culture where 
the identity of the Nepali citizen has been narrowly defined.3  In the early stages of the peace process, 
                                                          
2 Nepal News, ‘Nepal at the Helm Again’, vol 22, no.31, 2003 
3 Nepali citizenship has historically been associated with being male, Nepali speaking, of Hill origin and Bahun, Chettri or Newar 
caste, especially during the state consolidation phase of the Panchayat Government 1960-1990 (Bhasker Gautam, 2007 
personal correspondence). 
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this led to some progress on the proportional representation of marginalised communities in the lead 
up to, and results of, the 2008 constituent assembly elections won convincingly by the CPM.  However, 
currently there remain a number of latent tensions making the peace process fragile, such as the 
process of finalising a new constitution, where there are competing demands from ethnic, religious, 
caste and regional groups, as well as from the estranged opposition Nepali Congress (NC). There are 
also issues concerning the existence of dual armies and a wider context of food and general economic 
insecurity. These factors suggest that the government will continue to operate in a challenging 
environment as the peace process moves forward. It is here that the paper, a synthesis of the findings 
of a national participatory governance assessment undertaken in 2007, seeks to contribute by offering 
a window on grassroots citizens’ views on the key priorities to tackle in this early post-conflict era.  
 
1.2 Purpose 
 
In 2007, the National Planning Commission (NPC), aware that the causes of conflict were related to 
poor governance and exclusion, requested the support of the Department for International 
Development (DFID) to carry out a participatory governance assessment (PGA), so as to incorporate key 
corrective measures in the Three Year Interim Plan 2007/08 to 2009/10 (TYIP). In particular, the aim of 
the study was to assist the government to respond more effectively to poor and excluded groups’ 
priorities, and to ensure a broader state building process leading to the creation of a ‘New Nepal’. 
Equally importantly, by undertaking a participatory assessment of state-citizen relations in poor and 
excluded communities there was an explicit aim to identify common incentives between the 
government and the grassroots for positive change. Although the primary research for this paper was 
conducted over 2006/7, its content is still relevant for both contextual understanding and longitudinal 
mapping, It also provides a timely contribution to current exercises of political consensus-building. 
 
It is important to emphasise that this study was neither designed as a participatory poverty assessment 
that looks at poor people’s understanding of poverty, nor as a poverty monitoring exercise.  Instead it 
was conceptualised as a participatory governance assessment that aims to provide policy makers, 
donors and non-governmental actors with a better understanding of local power relations and how 
these enable or constrain the realisation of poor and excluded groups’ (women, Janajatis, Dalits, 
Madeshis, religious minorities) tangible and intangible priorities. Tangible priorities were broadly 
defined as access to services, infrastructure, livelihood security and the basic prerequisites for 
development such as law and order. Intangible priorities tapped into the more relational dimensions of 
deprivation and vulnerability, including the unequal and often multi-layered power relations that poor 
and excluded groups confront in their daily lives.4    
  
As the first community level participatory research undertaken since the peace process , the study 
constitutes an important first step in understanding governance from the point of view of poor people 
(from the ‘bottom-up’) in a post-conflict environment and why this is critical for long term state 
building.5 Although subject to very tight time constraints, it sought to explore how poor and excluded 
Nepalese understand citizenship, how they practice it, the barriers they face when interacting with the 
state and their views on how these could be overcome. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Here our analysis was informed by de Haan’s (1997) emphasis that the concept of social exclusion ‘takes us beyond mere 
descriptions of deprivation, and focuses attention on social relations and the processes and institutions that underlie and are 
part and parcel of deprivation’ (26). See also DFID 2005. 
5 See NPC, UNDP and UNICEF (2006) and ADB (2008) for a very interesting participatory studies focusing on individual case 
studies.  
  
3
1.3 Methodology  
 
1.3.1 Participatory research approach 
A considerable amount has been written about priorities for poor people in Nepal (MIMAP, 1996, DFID, 
2007) and there have also been a number of important individual case study approaches to 
understanding poor people’s experiences in recent years.6  However, since NEPAN’s 1999 Participatory 
Poverty Assessment (which was undertaken prior to the escalation of the conflict in 2002), there have 
been no national level participatory research endeavours that have sought to understand broad trends 
in state-citizen relations among poor and excluded groups.7   
 
The strength of participatory research is its ability to compile and collate information that quantitative 
techniques leave out. In particular, its emphasis on visual and oral methods of enquiry (as opposed to 
written and numerical methods) means it is able to be informed by poor people’s real-life experiences 
and their context-specific knowledge (Pratt, 2001). As such, participatory analysis is suited to a society 
as diverse as Nepal where poor people still comprise 31% of the population (Nepal Living Standards 
Survey, 2003/4), but where each community’s experience of poverty, and their engagement with the 
state, is different.  
 
1.3.2  Research design  
Drawing on modified PRA techniques and tools, this participatory governance assessment was 
designed as a series of focus group discussions.8 It was framed as a consultation on behalf of the 
Nepal National Planning Commission with poor and excluded groups and as the beginning of a 
dialogue on national development priorities on how best to strengthen social inclusion as a key pillar 
of poverty reduction.  Local government officials were also consulted in order to triangulate findings 
about governance practices at the sub-national level.   
 
1.3.3  Sampling and fieldwork  
Research was carried out in 21 communities spanning 10 districts (see figure 1 below). These were 
selected in order to cover the five regions of the country, the three main agro-ecological belts and both 
urban and rural sites. Within each district communities were purposefully selected in order to ensure 
the inclusion of diverse Terai and Hill Janajati, Dalit and poor Brahmin and Chhetri groups. In addition, 
one Middle Caste Terai group (Yadav) and one Muslim community were also included (see Tables 1 and 
2 below).  
 
The selection process was aided by key informants from local NEPAN network members, field workers 
of local NGOs and local district government offices. Before the field exercise, field teams underwent 
four days of training in order to develop a sound conceptual understanding of the study’s objectives, 
especially with regard to state-citizen dynamics, how processes of social inclusion play out in this 
relationship and how this affects the ability of poor and excluded people to trust and access 
government services, broadly defined. It the training provided a brief refresher course on participatory 
approaches in general, and on the specific PRA tools used in the study. 
 
In each community, separate focus group discussions involving 10-15 participants were held with 
women and men in order to better capture gender differences and to ensure that women would feel 
                                                          
6 UNDP/UNICEF, 2006; Action Aid, 2004, Pratt, 2001, NEPAN, 2006 
7 It is critical to emphasise from the outset, however, that this research was subject to very tight time constraints because of a 
concern to influence particular time-bound policy windows. It should therefore be viewed as a useful complement but certainly 
no substitute for more in-depth longer-term qualitative research work undertaken in studies such as the DFID/World Bank 
Gender and Social Exclusion Assessment (GSEA) and the Measuring Empowerment and Social Exclusion (MESI) studies. (In 
this vein, the concluding section of the report includes suggestions about future areas for investigation).   
8 Time Lines, Communications Linkage Matrix, Venn Diagrams, Scoring and Ranking, Citizen Score Cards 
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more at ease to voice their views given a cultural tendency for men to dominate group dynamics.9  The 
team leader and project coordinator also visited a selection of sites in order to ensure quality control.  
 
The study team also invested a considerable amount of time debriefing and conducting plenaries with 
field researchers to better understand the dynamics underpinning the findings. Many of the views 
required careful contextualisation of the diverse locales as well as an exploration of the possible 
reasons behind the silences and gaps in focus group discussions. 
 
1.3.4  Research questions   
The field research focused on five broad sets of questions, aiming to provide a first-hand picture of 
poor and excluded groups’ realities in post-conflict Nepal, as well as their expectations of the State in 
the immediate future:10: 
 
• poor and excluded groups’ views on the peace process and the ways in which their lives have 
changed (or not) in the post-conflict period 
• poor and excluded groups’ (tangible and/or intangible) priorities and their perceptions of state 
performance (both national and local) around access to services and infrastructure, and the 
delivery and quality of those services.   
• poor and excluded groups’ feedback on weaknesses in policy implementation (the ‘blockages’ 
in the system), including specific problem areas in recent service delivery mechanisms, and 
possible means of redress; 
• poor and excluded groups’ perceptions of - and interaction with - the state, including an 
understanding of what political processes enable or constrain positive engagement with the 
state for poor and excluded people 
• poor and excluded groups’ understandings of the current political reform and state 
restructuring processes and the extent to which they are involved or are interested to be 
involved in this process.  
                                                          
9 In two cases (Kapilbatsu and Kanchanpur Districts) focus group discussions were held in separate villages or wards due to the 
limited availability of participants. So a male focus group discussion was held in one ward/village and a separate female 
focus group discussion in different ward/village. Although the study also sought to understand the age-specific priorities and 
citizenship practices of youth and elderly, due to time constraints we were unable to hold separate age disaggregated focus 
groups discussions. However, an effort was made to ensure a balance of age groups in each discussion (youth, middle aged, 
elderly).  
10 In interpreting the findings of this study, it is important for the reader to bear in mind several methodological caveats. Given 
the urgency of consulting with poor and excluded groups in order to feed into the first post-peace process national 
development plan, the study was undertaken within a tight timeframe. This meant that we were not able to cover all 
dimensions of social exclusion, and there are a number of areas that particularly require additional investigation and analysis. 
First, just as mixed gender groups often makes it more difficult for women to voice their views, it would be valuable to carry out 
follow up research with separate age groups in separate focus group discussions in order to better explore emerging 
generational differences and potential tensions/ conflicts. In a number of discussions, differences between especially younger 
men and village elders were hinted at, but require additional exploration. Second, although disability constitutes an important 
dimension of social exclusion, the research design was not able to capture the particular concerns and needs of disabled 
people and we would argue merits a focused study of its own. Third, because this is the first participatory governance 
assessment of its kind in Nepal, we would recommend that future initiatives allow for extended training sessions in order to 
enhance field researchers’ understanding of the key concepts and study objectives, and therefore their ability to probe 
effectively. Lastly, it would be fruitful to triangulate poor people’s views with those of local government authorities and 
governmental and non-governmental service providers and development practitioners in order to develop a holistic and 
nuanced understanding of governance and citizenship at the local level. 
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1.3.5 Participants’ views on the research process  
Overall field researchers were struck by the high level of interest and enthusiasm that this participatory 
governance assessment generated. Many communities, especially poor Bahun and Chhetri groups, 
reported that this was the first time they had been consulted by the central government about their 
priorities and views on state-citizen interactions. Participants were largely eager to participate and have 
an opportunity to voice their opinions. For example, a poor Bahun/ Chhetri squatter settlement in 
Kanchanpur District emphasised that they had ‘never been visited by government, NGOs, donors or the 
media’, while a Dalit community in Bhaktapur asked for the telephone number of the National Planning 
Commission in order to ‘follow up once the study report is released’.  
 
 
Table 1.  Study Districts and their Key Characteristics 
Region 
Agro-ecological Belt    
Terai Hill Mountain 
Urban Rural Caste/Ethnicity/ Religion 
Name of District 
Eastern 
Siraha    ? 
Madheshi Dalit-Mushahar 
Terai Janajati-Tharu 
Middle class-Yadav 
  Taple-jung  ? Hill Janajati - Limbu,  Brahmin/Chhetri 
Central 
 Makawanpur   ? Hill Janjati - Chepang  
 Bhaktapur  ?  Urban Dalits –Sarki 
Western 
Kapilbastu    ? Muslim  Madeshi Dalit - Chamar 
 Tanahu  ? ? Hill Dalit - Kami 
Urban Janjati-Gurung 
Midwestern 
  Jumla  ? Hill Janjati  - Gurung Brahmin/Chhetri 
 Pyuthan   ? Hill Janajati –Magar Hill Dalit-Sarki 
Far Western 
Kanchanpu
r 
  ? ? Madhesi Janjati- Tharu  Urban Brahmin/Chhetri 
 Aachham   ? Hill Dalit - Damai Brahmin/ Chhetri 
Total 3 5 2 3 9  
NOTES: 
 
1. Three of the selected districts (Siraha, Pyuthan and Tanahu) were also included in the DFID/World Bank 
“Measuring Empowerment and Social Inclusion” study, in order to facilitate cross-checking in the analysis 
stage. 
 
2. Information in the last column is taken from District Demographic Profile of Nepal; Informal Research 
and Study Centre, Kathmandu, 2002 
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Table 2. Basic population data for social groups in the study districts 
 District 
name  
Total 
pop.  
Total 
% 
Selected caste/ethnicity/ 
religious minority 
Total % in 
selected 
district 
Total pop. of the 
selected 
caste/ethnicity/ 
religious 
minority in 
district 
1 Taplejung 359379 
6489973 
1.58 
28.54 
Hill Janajati 
Bahun Chhetri 
15.64 
0.46 
56234 (Limbu) 
29956 (B/C) 
2 Siraha 172434 
1533879 
895423 
 
0.76 
6.75 
3.94 
 
Madheshi Dalit 
Terai Janajati 
Madheshi middle caste 
18.27 
1.77 
15.36 
31519 
(Musahar) 
27252 (Tharu) 
 137622(Yadav) 
3 Makawanpur 52237 0.23 Hill Janajati  29.39 15353 
(Chepang) 
4 Tanahu 895954 
543571 
3.94 
2.39 
Hill Dalit 
Urban Janajati 
2.27 
7.25 
20411 (Kami) 
39418 (Gurung) 
5 Kapilbastu 971056 
269661 
4.27 
1.19 
Muslim community 
Madheshi Dalit 
9.63 
9.60 
93602 (Muslim) 
25893 (Chamar, 
Harijan, Ram) 
6 Jumla 543571 
6489973 
2.39 
28.54 
Hill Janajati  
Hill Bahun Chhetri 
0.02 
0.77 
 
128 (Gurung) 
50298(B/C) 
7 Kanchanpur 1533879 
6489973 
6.75 
28.54 
Tharu community 
Urban Bahun Chhetri  
5.74 
2.47 
88155 (Tharu) 
160949 (B/C) 
8 Aachham 318989 
6489973 
1.40 
28.54 
Hill Dalit 
 
1.86 
27.78 
5954 (Sarki) 
147856 ( B/C) 
9 Pyuthan 318989 
1622421 
1.40 
7.14 
Dalit  
Hill Janajati  
0.10 
4.01 
7837 (Sarki) 
65123(Magar) 
10 Bhaktpur 318989 1.40 Urban Dalit   
 
Table 2a: Percent composition of the population by caste/ethnicity, 2001 
 
Caste 
hierarchy  Name of caste/ ethnic minority group %   
Ca
st
e 
H
in
du
s 
(5
7.
5%
) 
High (32.8%) 
A Hill/Tarai B/C+ (a.1+a.2) 32.8 
a.1 Hill B/C+ (1+2) 30.9 
1 Brahman (Hill) 12.7 
2 Chhetri, Thakuri, Sanyasi 18.1 
a.2 Tarai B/C+ 1.9 
      
3     
Brahman, Rajput, Kayastha, Baniya, Marwadi, Jaine, Nurang, Bengali 1.9 
Middle 
(12.9%) 
B Tarai Middle Castes (Include 4-7) 12.9 
4 Yadav 3.9 
5 Teli, Kalwar, Sudhi, Sonar, Lohar 3.2 
6 Koiri, Kurmi, Kanu, Haluwai, Hajam/Thakur, Badhe, Bahae, Rajbhar 3.6 
7 
Kewat, Mallah, Nuniya, Kumhar, Kahar, Lodha, Bing/Banda, Bhediyar, 
Mali, Kamar, Dhunia 2.2 
Dalits (11.8%) 
C Dalits (c.1+c.2) 11.8 
c.1 Hill Dalits (8-11) 7.1 
8 Kami 3.9 
8 
 
 
9 Damai 1.7 
10 Sarki 1.4 
11 Gaine, Badi 0.0 
c.2 Tarai Dalits: (12-15) 4.7 
12 Chamar 1.2 
13 Musahar 0.8 
14 Dhusadh/Paswan, Tatma, Khatway, Bantar, Dom, Chidimar 1.6 
15 Dhobi, Halkhor, Dalit/Unidentified Dalit 1.1 
Ja
na
ja
ti
 (3
2.
2%
) 
Newar & 
Thakali (5.5%) 
D Janajatis (d.1+d.2) 37.2 
d.1 Hill Janajatis (d1.1+d1.2) 28.5 
d1.
1 Newar/Thakali (16+17) 5.5 
16 Newar  5.5 
17 Thakali 0.1 
Other Hill 
Janajatis 
(23%) 
d1.
2 Other Hill Janajatis (18-28) 23.0 
18 Magar 7.1 
19 Tamang 5.6 
20 Rai 2.8 
21 Gurung 2.4 
22 Lismbu 1.6 
23 Sherpa 0.7 
24 Bhote, Walung, Byansi, Hyolmo 0.1 
25 Gharti/Bhujel, Kumal, Sunuwar, Baramu, Pahari, Adivasi Janajati 1.5 
26 Yakkha, Chhantal, Jirel, Darai, Dura 0.2 
27 Majhi, Danuwar, Thami, Lepcha 0.7 
28 Chepang, Bote, Raji, Hayu, Raute, Kusunda 0.3 
Tarai  
Janajatis 
(8.7%) 
d.2 Tarai Janajatis (29-32) 8.7 
29 Tharu 6.7 
30 Dhanuk 0.8 
31 Rajbanshi, Tajpuriya, Gangai, Dhimal, Meche, Kisan, Munda 0.7 
32 Santhal/Satar, Dhangad/Jhangad, Koche, Pattarkatta/Kusbadiya 0.4 
Religious 
Minorities & 
Others (5.3%) 
E Religious Minorities (33-34) 4.3 
33  Muslim, Churoute 4.3 
34 Panjabi/Shikh 0.0 
35 Unidentified/Others 1.0 
  Total    100 
 
 
Source: Census 2001, Acharya et al.2004 ; reproduced from DFID/World 
Bank, 2005.   
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2. Poor and excluded people’s priorities 
 
Ascertaining poor and excluded groups’ priorities is a critical first step in designing an effective state 
building policy plan. It is particularly important in a post-conflict context where relations between 
citizens and the state have frequently broken down, and the original sources of the conflict (e.g. 
resource scarcity, social exclusion) have not been addressed (Hachhethu, 2004). Interestingly, many of 
the priorities identified by poor and excluded groups over the course of this study were consistent with 
those found in other participatory and qualitative research studies undertaken prior to the 2006 peace 
process.  
 
This is perhaps not so surprising given that particularly following the escalation of the conflict between 
the Maoists and the army in 2002 there was often an absence of government in rural (especially 
geographically isolated) areas and many development programmes had to be discontinued. In other 
words, the emergence of similar findings suggests that many of the priorities identified in earlier PRA 
studies still need to be tackled. Indeed, one of the key reasons why the participants in this study were 
positive about the peace process was that they were optimistic that the end of frequent disruptions to 
their daily lives by occupying armed forces from both sides in the conflict would provide the space for 
renewed attention to development programmes. It is however important to point out that the relative 
importance accorded to different priorities differs somewhat across studies, perhaps in part due to 
different research methodologies employed and different questions asked (see Table 4). Moreover, 
there are some important differences between priorities for poor people as mapped out in DFID’s 
Poverty Priorities for Nepal report (2007), and poor people’s priorities. For example, the former 
emphasised access to family planning services and measures to combat trafficking of women and 
prostitution, but these did not emerge in this participatory assessment.11 
 
The following section is organised as follows. It begins by presenting the overall trends that emerged. It 
then discusses four broad sets of priorities identified in the study’s focus group discussions – 
livelihood security, free and accessible services, connectivity and equality, respect and dignity – 
pointing out differences among groups and/or sites where relevant and community suggestions for 
improvement.  
 
2.1 General trends 
 
It is important to emphasise from the outset that the greatest variation in tangible priorities was across 
communities and districts, reinforcing the importance of local decision-making. For example, a key 
priority for the Gurung in Tanahu is the construction of a Buddhist temple which has been stalled 
several times by local authorities; the Mushuar Dalit community in Siraha wanted a community house 
to conduct community activities and to house guests; while Limbu and poor Bahun/Chhetri 
communities in mountainous Taplejung wanted a school playground for their children due to a dearth 
of playing areas in their VDC. Women in the Western mountain districts were anxious to have access to 
a flour mill to reduce their domestic work burden and smokeless stoves to reduce health hazards 
associated with traditional stoves, whereas for communities in Makwanpur district soil erosion control 
and a bridge emerged as important concerns. These variations notwithstanding, there were also 
important commonalities. The most frequently cited basic services and infrastructure priorities across 
the 10 districts are presented in Table 3,12 and include roads, education, health services and water in 
descending order of importance.13  
 
  
                                                          
11 This is not to argue that these issues are not important, but rather to point out that they were not identified by poor people 
themselves. 
12 Calculations were based on the top five priorities identified by focus group participants, even though some groups constructed 
a more extensive priorities list. 
13 It is important to note that employment opportunities as one of the top intangible priorities and is therefore discussed below. 
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Table 3:  Most common tangible priorities (in descending order) 
Roads Connectivity to markets and services, overcoming geographical isolation 
Education Remove user fees, unequal access to scholarships 
Health Remove or reduce user fees, expand range of treatment and medicines 
Water Expand access, and remove source of daily humiliation for Dalits 
Electricity  Remove sense of deprivation and expense and inconvenience of kerosene for those 
without access: increase hours of productivity (women)  
Irrigation Janajati, Muslim and B/C landowners  
Land  Dalits and B/C squatters 
Toilet  Higher priority for women, user fees  
Vet services Limited personnel, expensive medicines 
 
 
There was, however, a significant difference along caste/ethnicity lines. For Dalits and sukumbasi 
(squatter) populations the most important priority was land security (either land title or increased land 
size), whereas for poor Bahun and Chhetri and Janajati communities, most of whom are small 
landholders, irrigation was a major concern. Dalit communities were also particularly worried about 
access to water (for bathing and drinking) due to the daily humiliations they have to face as 
‘untouchables’ in accessing water from public water sources or ‘higher caste’ private residences.  
 
Although there was considerable discussion about unequal power relations between men and women, 
there was a surprisingly limited gender gap in terms of poor and excluded groups’ tangible priorities. 
Differences that did emerge included the importance to women of toilet facilities, telecommunications 
(due to the high level of international migration and desire to be in contact with relatives), flour mill (to 
reduce mountain women’s domestic labour burden), adult literacy and skills training. Access to 
veterinary services and affordable irrigation emerged as more important to men.    
 
Urban/rural differences were also difficult to pinpoint (e.g. land and motorable roads were as important 
for urban squatters as they were for poor rural and urban Dalits) due to significant variation across both 
urban and rural sites.  However, demands for a garbage dump and street lights were unique to urban 
communities (see table 4 for particular similarities and differences on research findings for poverty and 
social exclusion).  
 
2.2 Livelihood security 
 
A large number of male and female focus group participants identified a range of priorities that can be 
clustered into the general category of livelihood security. For rural communities, inputs to improve the 
productivity of their land (irrigation, agricultural extension services), the health of their livestock 
(veterinarian services) and improving land security (either through land title or larger, more 
consolidated land plots) were all of critical importance. But few of these small landholders and land 
tenants enjoyed more than four months of food security per year and were thus also equally anxious 
about a lack of employment and market opportunities, which were in turn compounded by limited 
access to skills training opportunities and credit and financial services. Urban communities were 
similarly concerned about a lack of land title (Dalits and sukumbasis) and a dearth of employment 
options. This is not surprising in light of high underemployment in the country and more than one 
million people working as international labour migrants.  
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Table 4:  Similarities/differences in research findings on poverty and social exclusion in Nepal 
Study  Similarities  Differences  
NEPAN 1999 
PRA  
Importance of unequal power 
relations as a dimension of poverty 
(caste, class, gender, nepotism)  
 
Importance of increasing 
understanding about root causes of 
poverty among officials and more 
advantaged social groups 
 
Limited NGO presence in poorest 
communities 
 
Relative importance of VDCs in 
people’s lives  
 
Importance of land insecurity   
Limited gender differences in NEPAN 1999 but mixed 
group FGDs 
 
Emphasis on access to family planning and limiting 
family size – but didn’t emerge as an issue in this 
participatory governance assessment 
 
NEPAN 1999 didn’t focus on governance issues, but 
recommended the need for participatory governance 
assessments  
DFID and World 
Bank Gender 
and Social 
Exclusion 
Assessment 
(2006)  
Complexities of social exclusion and 
intersection with poverty and 
vulnerability 
 
Importance of respect and dignity  
 
Importance of institutionalising 
participatory poverty monitoring as 
part of the Poverty Monitoring and 
Analysis System (PMAS) 
 
Improve the governance of 
community user groups  
Access to services focuses on education and health 
services only  
 
Observed few households for whom food security and 
survival issues are critical, in contrast to high 
proportion of households suffering from food 
insecurity in this participatory governance 
assessment 
 
Policy solutions focus on national policy and 
institutional changes; less emphasis on citizenship 
education, awareness raising and legal literacy.  
NPC, UNDP and 
UNICEF Voices 
of the Poor on 
Development  
2006 
Geographical isolation as an 
important dimension of poverty and 
exclusion  
 
Poverty entails experiences of 
humiliation, distrust, exploitation, 
ignorance and isolation  
 
Lack of access to information is 
critical  
 
Importance of gender inequalities 
 
Access to broad range of services 
and livelihoods opportunities are 
critical   
Strong sense of fatalism but in this participatory 
governance assessment the emphasis was on coping 
strategies  
 
Reluctance among participants to discuss conflict  
 
Focus on MDGs rather than local power relations and 
practices & understandings of citizenship  
 
Focus on individual case studies rather than 
community participatory assessments  
Action Aid 
2004 
Attention to poor Bahun/ Chetris and 
plight of urban squatters  
 
Eagerness among poor and excluded 
groups for their voices to be heard  
 
Weak communication links between 
citizens and the state  
Relative importance of NGOs in poor and excluded 
groups’ lives (but partly due to sampling of some case 
studies from Action Aid partners’ areas of work)  
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2.2.1  Market access 
Improving access to markets emerged as an important priority in two ways. First, many study 
participants who ranked improved road infrastructure as a top concern did so in part because of the 
difficulties in getting their products to markets efficiently and on time. Other communities, however, 
had more specific concerns: in Kanchanpur the Ranatharu were anxious for stronger and more 
equitable regulation of cross-border trade as they were struggling to compete with larger Indian 
merchants in Nepal while simultaneously denied access to markets in India. In Taplejung, the Limbu 
community were keen to improve local infrastructure in order to access the foreign tourist market which 
was relatively active in their district but their village was yet to benefit due to its geographical 
remoteness and poor road connections.   
 
2.2.2 Land title 
Squatter and Dalit communities strongly emphasised the importance of land title during this 
consultation.14  For poor Bahun/Chhetri squatters in Kanchanpur district it was the most pressing 
concern in their lives, as it meant they were subject to a permanent sense of insecurity and 
vulnerability vis-à-vis officials.15  The longer-term residents in the squatter settlement had been the 
victim of frequent changes in land legislation, while more recent arrivals were accused of belonging to 
the land mafia. Discriminatory treatment by service providers, dismissal of infrastructure improvement 
demands by government officials (e.g. requests for maintenance of drinking water pipes and adequate 
road drainage to prevent the overflow of city sewage into the settlement during the monsoon season) 
and intra-household violence were all blamed on the absence of land title. In order to address this 
marginalisation, focus group discussants suggested the need for sukumbasis to be identified as an 
excluded group that receives subsidised access to services and targeted development programmes.   
 
For poor urban and rural Dalit communities, land insecurity is similarly perceived to be at the centre of 
their vulnerability. Although many had been given small plots of land over time by rich landowners in 
exchange for their labour, this land was often made up of very small scattered plots. In some villages 
this fragmentation impeded community life as Dalit families were living spread apart with no 
community centre of which to speak. More importantly, because the land was not usually registered in 
their name, there was a fear that it could be confiscated according to the whim of the landlord. Dalit 
communities’ general sense of precariousness has therefore been exacerbated by the lack of land title, 
which until very recently had been a prerequisite for citizenship and access to services. It should also 
be noted that of the five Dalit communities in the survey, only in one were Dalits participating in a 
community forestry user group where they had access to communal land and natural resources.        
 
2.2.3 Irrigation 
Among impoverished landowners, sentiments about access to affordable irrigation were very strong.16  
Improved irrigation would improve land productivity, increase the number of potential harvests per 
year, and address chronic food insecurity (few communities we visited had more than 4 months food 
                                                          
14 This issue has also been emphasised in other studies (e.g. Community Self Reliance Center, 2003). Although it may be true 
that this sense of attachment to the land is because Nepal is only very recently transitioning away from a feudal rural society 
and subsistence agriculture is the mode of livelihood security with which poor, uneducated communities are most familiar, 
the perceived significance of land ownership should not be underestimated. Although land consolidation became a central 
plank of agricultural policy with the adoption of the Agricultural Perspective Plan in 1995,  there has never been a serious 
attempt to address this issue, presumably because of a combination of lack of will to drive the process forward, combined 
with its administrative complexity. It is therefore critical that going forward this issue is addressed in a transparent manner, 
and that alternative sources of livelihood security are provided to landless households until the problem is adequately 
tackled. 
15 It is worth pointing out that we do not know whether sukumbasi from other caste or ethnic groups face even greater economic 
and social exclusion. This is an area that could benefit from further research.  
16 For example, a poor Bahun/Chhetri community in Aacham district was initially unwilling to participate in this study 
consultation unless the researchers were connected to potential irrigation service providers, insisting that a lack of irrigation 
was their sole development problem. Although at the end of the focus group discussion they later admitted that they had not 
realised how multi-faceted and complex their poverty situation was, this anecdote highlights the acute importance attached to 
irrigation by many poor farmers.   
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security per annum). Many communities had heard—often via examples of India’s irrigation revolution--
of a variety of technological solutions to their irrigation problems, but lacked the necessary capital to 
invest in such technologies.17   
 
2.2.4  Veterinary services 
Few poor and excluded communities had been able to access qualified vets and affordable medicines 
for their livestock, but their households had suffered a significant financial blow when their animals 
had succumbed to disease. Many participants complained that they seldom encountered vets in their 
clinics; were compelled to pay bribes in order to secure a home visit; and even when they did receive 
service it was often untimely and the prescribed medicines either unavailable or excessively expensive.   
 
2.2.5  Agricultural extension services 
Many rural communities emphasised the importance of agricultural extension services to increase the 
productivity of their land and increase household food security. However, few had regular access to 
agricultural extension workers and up-to-date information flows, and there were a number of 
complaints about receiving poor quality and/or inadequate quantities of seeds, fertilisers and 
pesticides.    
 
2.2.6  Skills training 
In order to overcome their economic dependence (either on rich landowners or in the case of women, 
male relatives), many study participants emphasised the importance of access to skills training. 
Women were most interested in opportunities for skills training leading to self-employment as e.g. 
tailors or weavers, while Dalits were aware that their traditional skills had become outdated in many 
cases and were so eager to receive training in market-appropriate skills that build upon existing skill 
sets.  
 
2.2.7 Local employment opportunities 
Given the limitations of subsistence agriculture, there was strong demand for local employment 
opportunities, e.g. micro-enterprises, agro-processing factories etc. Although many families had at 
least one relative working abroad, family separation often exerted a high price (e.g. limited ability to 
communicate due to poor telecommunications connections, security/vulnerability concerns for 
remaining women and elderly) and did not always result in reliable remittance flows. For others a 
dearth of employment options left no choice but to engage in illegal activities – e.g. one Musahar 
community in Siraha district’s only income-generating option was illegal timber collection from a 
neighbouring forest, while in Kanchanpur some households were involved in smuggling in goods from 
India to sell at lower prices than local Nepali goods. (See Box 2 for further details).  
 
2.2.8  Access to longer-term financial credit 
A common concern was limited access to reliable longer-term credit and being at the mercy of 
exploitative moneylenders (who charge up to 70% interest per annum). Although some participants 
were involved in savings and credit groups or had received loans from targeted development 
programmes, the benefits were generally thought to be of limited value. In the case of savings and 
credit groups, group dynamics could be problematic and exclusionary, while targeted development 
programmes tended to provide inadequate loan amounts with excessively short pay-back periods. Few 
communities had access to banking services (and even when they did, they were often subjected to 
condescending treatment by bank officials) but this was usually seen as the most desirable option.18     
                                                          
17 The single most important barrier to increasing the irrigated area in Nepal is the fact that the  great majority of farms consist of 
a relatively large number of small, scattered plots. This makes efficient water management exceptionally difficult. It was for 
this reason that the Agricultural Perspective Plan of 1995 made land consolidation a central plank of its irrigation policy. 
However there has never been a serious attempt to address this issue, presumably because its administrative complexity 
combined with a lack of political will to drive the process forward. 
18 Nepal could benefit from closer study of Bangladesh’s experience with micro credit, since that country was the world leader in 
this field. The same negative issues have arisen there, but Bangladeshi micro credit organisations are now beginning to 
14 
 
 
2.3 Free and accessible services 
 
Service access was a common priority across all communities, and was defined predominantly as 
availability of cost-free services close to one’s settlement. Free access and proximity were much more 
common concerns than service quality, with the exception of education services where language of 
instruction emerged as an important dimension among some Janajati and Muslim communities.  
 
Communities tend to think that it is the government’s duty to provide a range of services free of charge, 
so that even when fees are low there is still a sense of resentment. This goes against the increasingly 
popular view that even the poor will value services more when they have to contribute to their 
financing. It is also worth remembering that many households have very limited and irregular access to 
cash and that daily labourers are paid as little as 40 to 50 rupees for a day’s work. In other words, 
seemingly low user fees from a donor’s or Kathmandu central government official’s perspective are not 
viewed in the same way in many parts of rural Nepal. This suggests the need for greater provision of 
income-generating employment opportunities and better access to credit for the poor. The emphasis on 
proximity of service provision must also be set in the context of very limited road infrastructure and an 
absence of transportation options in many of the communities under study.  
   
2.3.1  Education 
The two most frequent concerns about local schools were costs (uniforms and user fees to cover 
stationary and books) and the limited number of grades in local village schools. Although there is now 
a programme to provide Dalit children and all girls with scholarships to cover school tuition costs, 
these scholarships were not being universally received by the target population, with school 
management committees sometimes distributing the money as they saw fit. By contrast, parents of 
children from poor Bahun and Chhetri communities were often resentful that their children were being 
excluded from such benefits as they also struggled to meet their children’s expenses. In several 
communities, it was reported that parents and/or children had gone so far as to ‘wish they were Dalits’ 
in order to access such government subsidies—a powerful statement among poor Bahun or Chhetri 
communities, many of whom still practice rules of ‘untouchability’.    
 
Another component of user fees was the pressure to pay for private school teachers employed within 
public school systems. Although school management committees are able to fundraise for and employ 
private teachers in order to tackle problems of excessively high teacher:pupil ratios, poorer parents 
often feel under unwelcome pressure to contribute to these costs.  
 
The limited number of grades in many local schools serves as a powerful obstacle for many children 
receiving education beyond the third or fifth grade, especially girls who are often subject to mobility 
constraints due to fears for their safety (and reputation). (This problem was particularly acute in Muslim 
communities – see Box 1 below).  A number of communities had pooled resources to establish 
community run primary schools that cater to pupils above fifth grade, but faced constraints when trying 
to register these schools with the District Education Office which was concerned about ensuring 
adherence to existing teaching standards.  
 
Compared to other service providers, there were fewer concerns about teacher attitudes. Nevertheless, 
there were still a number of complaints about teacher absenteeism, discriminatory attitudes towards 
poor students and inadequate information about student performance provided to parents.  In the case 
of the Chepang community, there was also a very strong demand for teachers who could speak the 
local language and provide sufficient guidance to the students. Although the Makwanpur district 
community involved in this study had sought to have the teacher replaced because of the 
communication difficulties faced by their children, they withdrew their demand when the teacher 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
address them seriously, and some promising models are beginning to emerge. Serious analysis of this experience could help 
“fast track” the design of more appropriate policy instruments in Nepal. 
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became emotional and urged them to reconsider. They later suspected that district level officials had 
been bribed to accept this teacher’s posting despite inadequate language skills.  
 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Health services 
Health services emerged as a common priority but only in one focus group discussion did they emerge 
as the top priority. For most communities access to health services was a lower order priority than 
improved livelihood security or connectivity. Health services also came under a significant amount of 
criticism, with the exception of the female community health workers, who tended to be well liked and 
even viewed as champions of community interests. Although sub-health posts were present in most 
VDCs, frequent complaints included the lack of qualified personnel (often just an assistant or ‘peon’ 
was present), disrespectful treatment of the poor (including pregnant women), and very limited 
availability of medicines and treatments. Better services and medicines were available at expensive but 
more respectful private clinics, often staffed by the same healthpost doctors working in private 
practice. There were also suspicions by some participants that medicines intended for the healthposts 
were being sold for profit at private clinics. 
 
2.3.3 Drinking water 
Access to drinking water emerged as an important concern, and as discussed above was particularly 
important to Dalit community participants as water handling is a touchstone of untouchability 
practices. Dalits were often forced to lose their place in the queue at public water supplies in favour of 
‘higher castes’, and/or suffer regular humiliation by being compelled to ask to use the water source of 
‘higher caste’ families.19   
 
                                                          
19 In one Aacham community, this experience was particularly galling as the public water well that had been constructed inside 
the compound of a ‘higher caste’ household with strong social or political connections. 
Box 1: The role of the Madrasa in shaping citizenship 
  
An important difference between Muslim and other communities is the fact that many children are educated 
through a separate school system, the Islamic-informed madrasa. Typically local village madrasa run to grade 
3 or 5, and after that children need to transfer to a larger madrasa near the district headquarters or across the 
border in India. In the study community, a few boys transfer to government run schools, assisted by the 
recommendations of several Muslim teachers working in neighboring government schools. Girls are not 
allowed to attend the government school which is 1.5 kms away due to restrictions on their mobility and fears 
for their safety. As a result most girls do not have a chance to study beyond grade 5. Those girls who do 
transfer to the larger madrasa near the district headquarters emphasised the strict dress code imposed on 
female pupils. Community-run and financed madrasa are not registered with the government, and the 
curriculum differs significantly from government-run Nepali schools. Children learn four languages – Nepali, 
Urdu, Arabic and English, with explanations provided in their mother tongue, Awadhi. Other subjects are 
taught in Urdu – Urdu philosophy and literature, religion (Koran and other Islamic religious texts), Pan-Islamic 
Unity, Nepali Geography, Maths and Science. Interestingly no Nepali history or social studies are taught, and 
most textbooks are of Indian or Gulf State origin.   
 
In the study community, there are close links between the local madrasa and madrasas in Qatar and also 
India. Partial financial support was being provided by Qatar contacts. For boys who continue their education 
system in the madrasa system (up to BA level) the main employment opportunities open to them are as 
madrasa teachers either in Nepal, India, Qatar or other Gulf States. A number of local graduates had been 
given teaching contracts in Qatar. The local community was satisfied with the quality of the madrasa school 
system, but was concerned about the limited employment opportunities open to graduates within Nepal and 
thus hoped that Urdu would be officially recognised as a local language so that their sons would have access 
to civil service jobs.  A number of parents also hoped that a government run school could be established in 
their village so their children could benefit from both school systems. 
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In rural communities people’s priority was to have access to more taps and hand-pumps within their 
settlement and preferably within their own house compound, whereas in urban communities the 
concern was more about maintenance of drinking water pipes and monitoring them to ensure that they 
were safe. There were frequent complaints however that officials ignored demands for improved water 
sources. For example, in one case in Jumla an official had dismissed petitioners’ request for a safe 
water source by telling them they should make do with the river, which is well-known to be polluted. In 
urban Kanchanpur, officials refused to maintain the waterpipes even though there was a thick coloured 
film on water flowing from the local pipes.    
 
2.4 Connectivity  
 
Connectivity was identified as an important priority by many communities, especially those residing in 
hill and mountainous communities, underscoring the fact that geographical remoteness constitutes an 
important component of people’s experience of poverty. Part of this is no doubt connected to 
experiences of isolation and vulnerability during the conflict whereby communities were for years 
subject to frequent harassment and/or house occupation by Maoists and army forces with no possible 
recourse. It is also related to the daily limitations that people face in accessing markets, employment 
opportunities and communication channels to loved ones living abroad. This need has been 
heightened because of the conflict, given that so much infrastructure, particularly bridges, were 
destroyed. 
 
2.4.4 Roads 
Roads emerged as the most frequently cited priority across all the study communities, but demands for 
improved road infrastructure were most strongly articulated in mountainous districts and the 
Kanchanpur squatter settlement (which is subject to flooding and sewage overflows on an annual basis 
due to poor roads and drainage systems). A number of our study communities were more than 50kms 
away from district headquarters and in the absence of motorable roads, up to a full day’s walk away. 
 
2.4.5 Telephone 
With large number of family and relatives working abroad, access to affordable telecommunications 
channels was cited as a priority in a number of women’s focus group discussions. The fact that it was a 
female-specific priority reflects the disproportionate numbers of men working abroad as well as 
women’s role in maintaining family social capital.  
 
2.4.6  Post office 
The importance of reliable postal services is also linked to the high numbers of international migrants, 
and was seen as important both in terms of receiving remittances and communicating with relatives.    
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2.4.7 Electricity 
The weighting given to electricity was as much related to relative deprivation as it was to clearly 
articulated needs. In many cases, participants stressed their unhappiness that neighbouring 
communities were well lit but that they were suffering in darkness. The demand for electricity was also 
linked to a sense of frustration at the inefficiency of government – in many places poles had been 
erected a number of years earlier, symbolising the promise of electricity, but the wiring had never been 
provided. Even in cases where community lines came, house connections were often beyond the 
financial means of poor households. In several sites there was also mention of electricity transmission 
pylons having been destroyed during the conflict, and not yet repaired.  
 
Other concerns included the expense and inconvenience of kerosene (which has been subject to rising 
prices and frequent shortages due to strikes), and the need for women to increase their hours of 
productivity, especially in mountainous areas like Jumla and Taplejung.   
 
2.5 Greater equality, respect and dignity   
 
As many observers have noted, Nepal is a society characterised by deeply entrenched social 
hierarchies that permeate daily as well as political life.20   In this study the focus group discussions 
addressed issues of social exclusion by asking participants to talk about the intangible and relational 
dimensions of their lives that they would like to improve in order to tackle their poverty and 
vulnerability. Although these discussions were often difficult to initiate, once started they frequently 
                                                          
20 Refer to the DFID/World Bank GSEA for an excellent and more in-depth discussion of social exclusion and poverty. 
Box 2: Border opportunities and risks 
 
Nepal’s 900 km long open border with India has long elicited mixed attitudes, presenting both threats and 
opportunities. This sense of ambivalence was also shared by study participants living in Kanchanpur, 
Kapilbatsu and Siraha districts.  
 
First and perhaps most importantly India is seen as a source of economic opportunities. Remittances from 
labour migrants to India (and to the Persian Gulf) play an important role in supporting household livelihood 
security, and do not seem to be diminishing following the peace process. Although communities reported 
that male relatives were returning home more frequently following the conflict, few were staying permanently 
due a persistent lack of local employment opportunities.  
 
Goods are often cheaper and more abundant, meeting both household consumption needs and also those of 
small businesses. But market access is not always so unfettered in practice – whereas focus group 
discussion participants from the Kanchanpur Ranatharu community were often subject to fines from customs 
officials or police on either side of the border for attempting to bring in bulk goods, they struggled to compete 
with larger Indian merchants who tended to flood local Nepali markets with cheaper products. In order to 
ensure greater livelihood security, an important priority identified by this community was better/ fairer 
regulation of markets in the border vicinity.  
 
A combination of economic opportunities and family ties also encourage large numbers of cross-border 
marriages. Parents of sons are often keen to attract an Indian bride because of the larger dowry she will 
typically bring to the family, while marrying into an Indian family is viewed as a way to ensure greater 
economic prosperity for one’s daughter. Although some parents in the focus group discussions were aware of 
the sometimes violent treatment meted out to daughters-in-law in some Indian households and worried that 
living across the border gave them little chance to intervene in such cases, economic considerations 
generally won out in marriage decisions.  
 
Cross-border migration also emerged as an important influence in terms of social and political learning. Caste 
cleavages were more easily overcome when living abroad, and understandings of alternative governance 
systems were often based on observations of Indian federalism, targeted development programmes and state 
subsidies. Cross-border religious ties also emerged as significant for some Hindu and Muslim communities.  
18 
 
 
elicited very impassioned responses. What was perhaps most striking was the disjuncture between 
participants’ often surprisingly clear sense of inequality and injustice on the one hand, and behavioural 
practices on the other (particularly among men and poor ‘higher caste’ participants). Among Dalits and 
Janajati men, for example, although they were often able to recognise the unfairness of the way in 
which they treated their wives and daughters, they were reluctant to change for fear of being looked 
down upon in public for breaking traditional social codes. Patterns of inequality were not seen as 
natural or ‘god-given’ or something to which one becomes habituated and immune, but rather the 
source of often daily upset and loss of dignity.  
 
Overall, inequalities between men and women emerged as the most frequently cited priority area to 
address, followed by economic inequalities, caste and ethnic cleavages, and regional differences. In 
this section we also discuss problems of social exclusion experienced by the elderly, religious 
minorities, and problems of community disunity, which emerged as important issues in several 
communities.    
 
2.5.1  Inequalities between men and women, girls and boys  
Inequalities between men and women emerged as the most common intangible area of concern, 
especially in the women focus group discussions but also among a surprising number of male groups. 
Participants were not necessarily advocating full equality, but definitely saw ample scope for 
improvement. This is in marked contrast to the 1999 NEPAN PPA where gender differences did not 
emerge strongly. NEPAN argued that this was perhaps because the demands of household survival 
were so immediate and pressing. Changes over time may be due to a growing consciousness of gender 
discrimination brought about by an active grass roots women’s movement that has emerged through 
the many local women’s groups – and the considerable attention given to gender injustices by the 
Maoists in the intervening years.  But it is also worth noting that this earlier PPA involved mixed group 
discussions and that women may have felt less confident to speak out about their gender specific 
grievances in such an environment. This difference may also reflect a general perception among the 
focus group participants that gender differences are not static but changing over time. Many 
emphasised that things were worse ‘before’.  
 
The first axis of inequality identified by many participants was the unequal gendered division of labour. 
Women have to shoulder reproductive duties (domestic chores, child and elderly care) as well as 
productive labour responsibilities, whereas men are largely only responsible for productive labour 
activities. In Jumla district, for example, women were said to ‘be like pack animals’ due to their taxing 
work load, and especially in contrast to men who spend long hours playing games at teashops. There 
was also a sense that women were more responsible with money (e.g. women were more likely to 
persist in savings and credit groups over time), whereas men have a tendency to ‘squander money’ and 
in some communities to drink excessively and take out their frustrations on their wives and children.21   
Despite this clearly unequal division of labour, a number of women’s focus group discussions were 
critical of their exclusion from household decision making processes. For instance, despite women 
having to put in long hours to take care of livestock they were rarely consulted on decisions to sell or 
purchase new animals, let alone having access to the profits. Similarly, they also complained that their 
dependence on their husbands was exacerbated by a lack of property rights and land title in their 
name.22   
 
Traditional cultural practices were a second important area that men and women alike identified as 
reinforcing women’s unequal status within the family and society. These varied considerably across 
different regions of the country (see Box 3 below), suggesting that there is no uniform patriarchal 
                                                          
21 In this study, problems of domestic violence were expressed in Kanchanpur and Taplejung districts, but other research 
suggests that the problem of family violence is likely to be much more widespread.  
22 Although legislation (the Nepal Citizenship Act 2006 and the Civil Code, 11th Amendment) was passed in May 2006 allowing 
women equal property and land rights, and the ability to pass on their citizenship rights to their children, awareness of this 
change is clearly very low among poor and excluded women, suggesting the need for legal literacy initiatives to which we 
return later in the report.   
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system, but rather diverse patriarchal practices and belief systems that will need to be tackled through 
a decentralised, context-specific approach.  
 
In many communities, gender inequalities start very early in life. In Kanchanpur focus group discussion 
participants pointed out the local simile ‘boys are like orange trees, daughters like dried grass’ which 
clearly encapsulates a widespread son preference. Equally disturbing is a growing trend in some poor 
communities to use sex-pre-selection technologies in order to abort female foetuses. In Pyuthan 
district, participants from a poor Bahun and Chhetri community admitted that it was increasingly 
common for families to use their meagre savings to finance a trip to the Indian border to visit a clinic 
they knew of that performed sex pre-selection examinations and provided abortions where necessary. 
Although there was a sense among these women that this practice was problematic, they were under 
strong familial pressure to have sons but also to keep family numbers down.  Within the Muslim 
community in Kapilbatsu district, restrictions on girls’ mobility starts as early as age 8 or 9, with many 
girls never having travelled more than two kilometres from their house. Whereas some boys are allowed 
to attend the government school after the local Koranic school, this option is not open to their female 
counterparts.     
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For many women a sense of economic dependence was seen to be at the heart of their inferior status. 
Key priorities to address this included access to literacy and adult non-formal education classes, skills 
training (particularly to allow them to become self-employed) and employment opportunities. A related 
and bitter complaint among both men and women was the ubiquitous gendered wage discrimination – 
it was reported that women are typically paid one third to one half of men’s daily wage rate, often for 
the same work.23  In some cases, they are not even rewarded monetarily, just in kind. Male complaints 
about this system were related to the fact that even with two working adults in the household it was 
often very difficult to make ends meet. 
                                                          
23 The 2004 NLSS II data shows that overall women are paid 73% of men’s wages (which is down from 1996 when they received 
only 81% of male wages). The 2006 DHS data reveals that 41 percent of working women are paid only in kind – and 23 percent 
are not paid at all.   
Box 3: Examples of traditional gender discriminatory practices  
  
In Western mountain districts, under the chaupadi system menstruating women are banished for reasons of 
ritual ‘impurity’ to animal stables or worse far from the house for 5-9 days each month. This was identified as a 
harmful traditional practice that needs to be curbed through concerted awareness raising efforts. Similarly, the 
maltreatment of widows who can be the victims of vindictive accusations of witchcraft was also identified as a 
problem.   
 
In the Terai, the marriage dowry (daijo or dahej) system is serving to reinforce inequalities between boys and 
girls. Parents are reluctant to invest in their daughters’ education beyond the fifth grade as daughters not only 
leave the family after marriage (with sons taking care of parents in their old age) but also the more educated a 
girl is the more expensive the dowry needed to attract an equally or better educated husband.  
 
Among the Ranatharu community in Kanchanpur district, women’s position within the family is rendered 
precarious because of the practice of men taking multiple wives (as long as they can afford ‘two meals a day 
and sufficient soap for each wife’). Similarly problematic is a custom which sees many child betrothals 
between a younger boy and an older girl with the objective that the girl will be sufficiently experienced at 
household management once the boy reaches adulthood. Focus group discussions, however, emphasised that 
many girls married under such arrangements are later deserted by their husbands who had no choice in this 
arranged marriage system. 
 
Chepang men from Makwanpur emphasised that one of the barriers to their community’s development was 
‘outmoded ways of thinking’. “Our way of looking at women is very traditional – we doubt them, question them, 
we don’t educate them because they will marry into another house anyway. We haven’t updated our thoughts 
but this needs to change”.  
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Although not mentioned as frequently, there was also a recognition among some women that their 
priorities were not likely to be addressed as long as they were excluded from community decision-
making processes and political representation. In Kanchanpur, sukumbasi women lamented that when 
they had organised collective action efforts to improve facilities in the settlement, their spouses had 
accused them of ‘taking over men’s roles’ or ‘acting like men’. Other women, for example the Chepang 
in Makwanpur, complained that the reservations for women in community user groups were not 
honoured. Similarly, when identifying blockages in the system that impeded the realisation of local 
development priorities, several women identified the lack of women’s political representation as a 
factor.  
 
2.5.2 Caste inequalities  
The social exclusion of poor Dalit communities is reinforced in highly visible and degrading ways on a 
daily basis. Such routine humiliation explains in part why a significant proportion of the CPN support 
base came from impoverished Dalit communities (Thapa, 2003).  Although addressing land and 
livelihood insecurities emerged as top priorities among Dalits, focus group participants nevertheless 
spoke passionately about the ‘mental anguish’, injustice and indignity of the untouchability practices 
to which most—both urban and rural communities—are still subjected.  
 
• In Siraha district, the Musahar community emphasised the beatings to which they were subject 
if they displeased the landowners for whom they worked, the indignity of having to answer to 
their whims and work unpaid on demand in ‘high caste’ homes, and the way they are fed on 
grass leaf plates rather than regular plates by landowners. (In several communities the feudal 
system of working for the landowner in exchange for a certain amount of grains from the 
biannual harvests (rather than cash compensation) is still practiced, further reinforcing Dalits 
sense of dependency and risk aversion.  
• In Aacham, the problem of scattered land plots in amongst ‘upper caste’ land holdings means 
that on the occasion of a Dalit person’s death, families are obliged to seek out long circuitous 
routes through the hills to avoid sullying ‘upper caste’ properties.  
• In Pyuthan women focus group participants emphasised that their positive feelings towards the 
Maoist were partly linked to their willingness to accept Dalit hospitality and take the time to 
enter their houses, sit with them and eat their food.   
• In urban Bhaktapur, if a Sarki drinks tea in a local teashop s/he is still obliged to use separate 
cups and to wash the teacup afterwards, in order to the preserve ‘ritual purity’ of the 
shopkeeper and other clients .  
 
In all cases, Dalits emphasised that they wanted to be treated with respect and dignity, and to be given 
a voice. However, the question from one Bhaktapur focus group participant that if the caste system 
were abolished and all were made equal, ‘who would decide what everyone would do?’ (in terms of 
occupation), underscores the extent to which the caste hierarchy continues to disempower those at the 
bottom of the hierarchy and limit their very sense and scope of the possible.        
 
2.5.3 Regional inequalities  
The two most heartfelt cases of regional discrimination were found among people from Jumla District in 
Karnali Zone and the Madeshis from the Terai. In the case of Jumla, large numbers of the Gurung 
community had been recruited to the army and so had been stationed throughout the country. But 
there were strong complaints that they were looked down upon and socially excluded due to their 
origins from Karnali Zone, Nepal’s most under-developed region.  
 
The Madeshi movement has captured widespread attention since the January 2007 uprising led by the 
Madeshi People’s Forum. The high death toll (40+ fatalities) and persistent security threats particularly 
in the Central and Eastern Terai have ensured that historical patterns of political exclusion and 
discrimination by Nepalese of hill origins towards those of the Terai are firmly on the national political 
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agenda (see e.g. Yadav, 2006). This in turn has led to a broader questioning about popular imaginings 
of the Nepali national identity – historically defined according to four key pillars: the Monarchy, Nepali 
language, Hindu religion and bravery as symbolised by the Gurka army.24  Views about these issues 
were, however, surprisingly diverse (including within caste and ethnic groups) among the poor 
communities from three Terai districts included in this study, Kanchanpur, Kapilbatsu and Siraha.  
 
• The Ranatharu from Kanchanpur were categorically opposed to the Madeshi movement and its 
violent tactics (as well as to any broader Janajati movement), claiming to be the indigenous 
Terai Janajati.  
• The Siraha Tharu community by contrast appeared to support the broader objectives of the 
Madeshi Forum and the women in particular emphasised how poor Madeshis such as 
themselves had been treated ‘worse than animals’ by government officials.  
• Musahar Dalits of Siraha did not self-identify as Madeshi, seemed to be sympathetic towards 
the Maoists and what they could do to alleviate caste discrimination.  
• The middle caste Yadav community in Siraha was very concerned about the potential for 
communal violence due to the Madeshi movement mobilisation, and was perhaps the least 
optimistic about the peace process among all the communities.  
• In Kapilbatsu district, there was a stronger sense of identity as Madeshis among both Dalit and 
Muslim communities, but only when citizens were interacting with government officials 
(typically from hill districts). Whereas the Muslim community in the study had a separate and 
strong sense of identity as a vulnerable religious minority among neighboring wards and 
referred to themselves as ‘non-Madeshi’ in this context, in interactions with bank managers 
and civil servants they complained bitterly about discriminatory treatment by ‘hill people’ 
against Madeshis. The Kapilbatsu Chamar community expressed similarly multi-layered 
identities – criticism of exploitative Madeshi landowners but similarly united in their opposition 
towards hill origin government officials.     
 
2.5.4 Religious equality?   
The Interim Government of Nepal declared the country a secular state on May 18 2006 but there was 
little sense that poor people from religious minorities  had experienced any benefits, such as greater 
ease to practice their religion or more equal access to public funding for religious facilities.25 It is also 
worth noting that the experiences of the three communities with strong religious identities in the study-
-Buddhist Gurung in Tanahu, Christian Chepang in Makwanpur and Muslims in Kapilbatsu—were highly 
varied, suggesting the need for a carefully nuanced  understanding of religious identity and how it 
intersects with broader patterns of social exclusion.  
 
• In the case of Tanahu Gurung, one of their top priorities was the construction of a local 
Buddhist temple. However, even though they had formed a committee and initially successfully 
persuaded local authorities to provide financial support and land for the project, this had 
subsequently been thwarted as authorities identified other priorities they deemed more 
pressing.   
• The Chepang, Hill Janajati from Makwanpur, had converted from Hinduism to Christianity, and 
were more concerned about overcoming ‘outdated thinking and practices that had prevented 
the community from developing’ than getting state support for their religious activities. They 
recognised the church’s positive role in reducing alcoholism in the community and were quietly 
confident of their different belief system, warning field researchers ‘Don’t think it odd if you see 
us up at night meditating – sometimes we dream of God and are called to do this’. The 
community already had a local church, which was used as a community center, likely supported 
by foreign missionaries active in the area.  
                                                          
24 Key informant interview with Bhasker Gautam of Martin Chauteri Research Institute. 
25 Hinduism is the majority religion in the country, with Hindus comprising 81% of the population. Religious minorities include 
Buddhists (11%), Muslims (4.3%), Kirats (2%), Christians (%) and Atheists (0.3%).  
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• The findings from the Muslim community in Kapilbatsu district suggest that poor Muslim 
communities are especially vulnerable, experiencing multiple and overlapping sources of social 
exclusion.26  This is based on i) their religious identity, ii) status as minority language speakers, 
and iii) identity as Madeshis when dealing with predominantly hill-origin government officials, 
and is in turn frequently exacerbated by their education in a separate religious school system 
that offers only limited employment opportunities. Moreover, this study’s findings suggest that 
religious tensions exist beneath the surface in parts of Nepali society and that there is thus a 
need for sensitive monitoring of this situation as well as policy efforts to promote greater social 
inclusion (see Box 4 below for further details).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5.5 Elderly vulnerability  
The vulnerability of elderly people emerged as a concern both among the elderly themselves and 
among the younger generation. In communities where livelihood concerns were paramount and 
precarious (especially among Dalits), elderly people perceived their inability to contribute to productive 
                                                          
26 This is in line with the Nepal Living Standard Survey II that found that the national poverty incidence dropped an average 11 
points from 1996 to 2004 – from 42% to 31%. However, for Muslims the decrease in poverty was lowest: just 6% compared to 
42% among Bahun/Chhetri, 21% among Dalits and 10% among Hill Janajatis. 
Box 4: Underlying religious tensions?  
 
Muslims comprise just 4.3% of the total Nepali population, and have received relatively little attention in 
development discourse to date. In Kapilbatsu district, however, Muslims make up approximately one fifth of 
the population. Although they identify as Madeshi when confronted by unreceptive Pahadi (hill origin) 
government officials, they concurrently see themselves as non-Madeshi when explaining local village social 
and political dynamics. When first asked about religious discrimination or inequality, the Muslim community 
in this study insisted there were good relations between Hindus and Muslims. However, further probing 
suggested that the reality was more complex.  On the one hand, there was some participation in respective 
religious festivals, but on the other whereas Muslim community members in the research site had helped 
other wards in road construction work, when it came time to reciprocate, support was denied on the pretext 
that their community was better off (including owning a tractor) and so did not need support. Although it may 
have been in part due to different political party affiliations (a much respected community leader had been a 
RPP ward chair for 15 years in the past), it is worth noting this was the only majority Muslim ward in the VDC. 
 
Focus group participants further noted that in situations where this community had different views from non-
Muslim neighbours, they would be reminded of previous incidents that had resulted in Muslim boys and men 
throughout the district having to flee across the Indian border. Although the incidents (where a cow had 
apparently been killed by non-Muslims but dumped outside a Muslim house and attributed to a Muslim 
slaughterer) had happened between 8 and 10 years ago in a neighboring VDC, the fear associated with those 
incidents was still sufficiently strong as to leave the community feeling vulnerable. Memories of 
Hindu/Muslim communal violence in neighboring Uttar Pradesh following the demolition of the Babri Mosque 
in Ayodhya in 1992 had further exacerbated this sense of insecurity, and were perhaps being reinforced by 
recent protests by Hindu fundamentalists in India against the declaration of Nepal as a secular state in 2006.   
 
In addition, complex caste and religious dynamics also appear to be operating – the focus group participants 
sought to emphasise that caste discrimination was insignificant within the Muslim community, arguing that 
while it might have once existed ‘it wasn’t practised anymore’.  However, in reality it seemed that Muslim 
Dalits were still subject to some untouchability practices, and all Muslims were also prevented from entering 
Hindu kitchens (although the reverse was not true).        
 
Lastly, it is important to note the global connections of this community to India and Qatar in particular, 
suggesting that it is seeking to compensate for a lack of local security by developing cross-border social 
capital. In addition to the close relations with the Indian, Qatar and Saudi Arabia madrasa systems, the 
construction of an imposing new mosque was being financed by a wealthy Muslim Indian businessman.   
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work activities as burdensome on the family. Indeed, in one focus group discussion involving a number 
of elderly men in the Kapilbatsu Chamar community, a community home for the elderly was proposed 
as a priority development issue in order to reduce their dependence on their sons and daughters and to 
receive more regular care.  Other elderly people complained of their isolation as their relatives 
increasingly migrated abroad for work, and even sons who participated in the focus group discussions 
but migrate seasonally expressed their concern that they are unable to care for their parents in the way 
they feel they should.  
 
In this vein the importance of the senior citizen and widow pensions was articulated in a number of 
focus group discussions. Those who were receiving a pension emphasised their importance in reducing 
their dependency but also argued that the amount should be increased as it was insufficient to be self-
sufficient. There were also a significant number of complaints from elderly and children with elderly 
parents that they were not receiving a pension even though they believed they were eligible. Key 
problems included elite capture, insufficient funding at the local level, and problems with age 
certification.  
 
• In Jumla women who met the criteria for widow or senior citizen pensions had been told that 
only a certain number of pensions could be funded and that they would have to wait for a year 
or more.  
• In Kapilbatsu elderly men complained about the citizenship card process whereby officials had 
not taken the time to assist illiterate applicants to calculate their correct birth date and had 
apparently assigned them arbitrary ages. Accordingly elderly people who meet the age criteria 
of 75 years are sometimes officially recorded as being a decade or more younger and thus have 
little hope of receiving state support.  
• In Aacham daughters-in-law pointed out that although at least 10 women in their village should 
be eligible for a widow’s pension no one had ever received one, nor had the elderly been given 
their senior citizen pension. VDC officials had collected people’s names but had never 
delivered.   
 
2.5.6 Poor ‘higher caste’ communities 
Our findings on poor Bahun, Chhetri and Yadav communities call into question conventional thinking 
on exclusion. In particular, they challenge the commonplace view that automatically sees Bahuns and 
Chhetris as the most advantaged social group, and cautions us to adopt a more nuanced view of the 
interplay between poverty and exclusion. The communities in our study expressed a strong sense of 
social exclusion, and emphasised that they had not been consulted by either governmental or non-
governmental actors about their problems. Indeed the poor Bahun and Chhetri communities in Jumla 
and Kanchanpur in this study suffered from a higher lack of access to services and basic infrastructure 
than their Janajati (Gurung and Ranatharu, respectively) counterparts. Their sense of exclusion was 
based on two key points. First, intra-community cleavages between what many people referred to as 
‘the cunning’ [dhurta or chalaach] and ‘the simple’ [sojha sajha] meant that they did not feel able to 
rely on connections with better off members of their caste group to address their problems. Indeed 
there was a sense among the Yadav in Siraha District that they were looked down upon by other better 
off members of their own community on account of their impoverished circumstances. Second, there 
was a strong, often emotionally articulated, perception that they are being excluded from development 
programmes, which are largely targeted at Dalits and Janajatis (see discussion above on school 
scholarships).  
 
Findings from this study suggest that efforts by the Maoists to break down caste discrimination had not 
necessarily been sustainable – one of the ‘positive’ changes brought about by the peace process for 
some Bahun/Chhetri communities was the freedom to revert to practising ritual purity. Although they 
had been compelled to allow Dalits into their compounds during the Maoist insurgency and even to eat 
together, they had now ceased this interaction. Only in the market and other public places did they feel 
it was necessary to be on their guard against any obviously visible untouchability practices. This 
indicates that in order to address caste inequalities and effectively address social tensions that might 
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threaten the fragility of the peace process, there is a pressing need for legal and affirmative action 
measures to be accompanied by sensitive civic education programmes. Only then can the risk of future 
conflict be avoided and meaningful, internalised and sustained changes be internalised (provided 
behaviour, attitudes and structures are addressed in a long-term programme to ensure sustained 
transformation). 
 
2.5.7 Janajatis (indigenous minority peoples)  
Indigenous minority groups constitute 37 percent of the Nepali population, but are highly diverse 
comprising some 59 different groups27  and over 100 languages. This diversity was also highlighted in 
the study which incorporated 6 relatively populous Madeshi and Hill Janajati groups – Ranatharu and 
Tharu (Kanchanpur and Siraha), Gurung (Jumla and Tanahu), Magar (Pyuthan), Chepang (Makwanpur) 
and Limbu (Taplejung). These communities differed in terms of poverty levels, level of political 
organisation, language and sense of identity (see Table 5). What is striking is that although they fall 
outside the Hindu caste system, and have some common interests in terms of a desire for greater 
political representation and recognition of their language and culture, no sense of pan-Janajati 
cohesion or more specific development demands emerged. However, there were clear signs of 
increased debate and organising around these issues as evidenced by the number of ethnic, political 
and non-political groups formed in research sites since the peace process.    
 
Table 5: Key characteristics of Janajati communities in this study 
Community 
name 
Location Level of political 
organisation  
Language Poverty level  Primary identity 
Ranatharu Terai  Well organised 
(Tharu Welfare 
Society) 
Tharu Relatively better 
off  
‘Indigenous Janajati’, not 
Madeshi 
Tharu Terai Not organised Maithili, 
Tharu  
Disadvantaged Madeshi  
Gurung Hill  Not organised Gurung Disadvantaged 
(Jumla), Relatively 
better off (Urban 
Tanahu)  
Gurung, army and foreign 
army connections 
Magar Hill  Not organised 
although a Magar 
organisation 
does exist in the 
district 
Magar but 
community 
mixes with 
Nepali 
Disadvantaged Magar – aware of one Magar 
minister in the past but not 
enough to make a  
meaningful difference  
Chepang  Hill  Some level of 
political 
organisation 
(Chepang Song) 
Chepang Highly 
disadvantaged 
i) Access to the forests, land 
and water is their ‘cultural 
and ethnic right’; ii) access 
to bilingual education and 
services is critically 
important; iii) overcoming 
community disunity is a 
major concern 
Limbu  Hill  Not organised  Limbu Highly 
disadvantaged 
Aware of Limbu Liberation 
Front but unsure whether it 
will address their primary 
concerns which are 
livelihoods related 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 This is the official number of groups declared by the National Foundation for Indigenous Nationalities.   But this is contested 
by for example, groups like the Rai who contain numerous subgroups who speak mutually unintelligible languages and feel 
these groups should be separately recognized. 
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3. Interacting with the state  
 
3.1 Concepts and practices of grassroots citizenship   
 
Analysts interested in issues of state building and governance are increasingly concerned with how 
poor and excluded groups understand and experience citizenship and the patterning of state-citizen 
interactions (e.g. Manor 2003, Mooij 2005). Although policy makers and development practitioners 
may not always apply lessons, Corbridge et al. (2005) emphasise these actors have much to learn from 
a more nuanced understanding of how the poor ‘see the state’ because ‘States are best thought of as 
bundles of everyday institutions and forms of rule’ (p5). In this vein, this section now turns to the heart 
of the participatory governance assessment by exploring how poor and excluded Nepalese understand 
citizenship, how they practise it, the barriers they face when interacting with the state and their views 
on how these could be overcome.  
 
One of the most striking general findings of this study is the surprising degree of citizen-state 
engagement, especially in the context of a country that has until recently been torn by conflict and 
where many citizens hold painful memories of abuses by government security forces and police. 
Although the field research was undertaken relatively shortly after the peace process, few communities 
were able to pinpoint any significant changes in links with government agencies in the post-conflict 
period, suggesting that the findings also reflect people’s general experiences in recent years during the 
conflict. When asked to list the government agencies with which they interact in their daily lives, focus 
group discussants were able to identify a surprising number (average of 8.5) of state offices.28 As we 
will discuss further below, however, the level of satisfaction with the quality of this interaction was 
generally very low.  This number was lower among Dalit communities (average of 7.4 cf. 8.9 for non-
Dalits) and women (7.7 cf. 9 for men), possibly reflecting higher levels of illiteracy, time, poverty and in 
the case of women, especially Muslim and Bahun/Chhetri women, mobility constraints.  
 
There was, however, one uniform and significant absence – institutions of formal justice (e.g. courts or 
paralegals) across all communities regardless of caste/ethnicity/gender/ geography/ religion. As we 
discuss in more depth below this is perhaps symbolic of the fact that the poor feel especially excluded 
from access to institutions of formal justice.   
 
A second significant dimension of citizens’ ‘sightings of the state’,29 is the strong not only physical but 
also psychological connection they have to local (primarily village-level) government, likely reinforced 
by the relative isolation of many poor communities from the central state during the conflict period. In 
fact, it was only relatively recently (1999) that the institutional framework for meaningful political 
decentralisation was defined and legislated through the Local Self-Governance Act (LSGA). The LSGA 
coincided with the Ninth Five-Year Plan which emphasised poverty reduction and rural development, 
while the current Tenth Plan goes further to consider decentralisation in a cross-cutting sense, 
promoting fiscal, administrative and functional devolution. This process was driven by close 
collaboration between government agencies, development partners (particularly UNDP and DANIDA), 
local bodies and civil society (Nepal Development Forum 2004). 
 
Previously, during the Panchayat era, the Decentralization Acts of 1982 and 1984 merely provided an 
extended central arm of government operations with little emphasis on fiscal and local governance 
processes (ibid.). After the first People’s Movement and the re-introduction of parliamentary politics, 
progress was made in 1992 with the establishment of three Local Body Acts that instituted District 
Development Committees (DDCs), Village Development Committees (VDCs) and Municipalities -  
although these changes did not precipitate much change in decision making power, effectively 
                                                          
28 This finding emerges as all the more significant when compared to Corbridge et al. (2005)’s findings from North East India 
where in a similar exercise participants identified significantly fewer representatives of the state.  
29 This language is borrowed from Corbridge et al, 2005.  
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deconcentrating state structure (ibid.). Morevover, scheduled local elections could not be held in 2002 
due to the dissolution of parliament and elected local bodies, while turnout in 2006 was poor.   
 
When asked to list the main individuals or agencies that represent the state for them, the most 
common response was the local VDC chair, followed by ward chairpersons and the District 
Development Committee (DDC) chair. Central government figures seemed far removed from popular 
imaginings of the state. This is not to argue that poor and excluded groups are largely satisfied with 
local governance, but instead to emphasise that notwithstanding multiple and often deeply felt 
criticisms of local government officials, they are nevertheless more supportive of decentralised policy 
decision-making processes. This support was clearly stronger in locales where VDC or ward chairs had 
organised public consultation meetings or made visits to the village and was a figure that local people 
could name.  
 
Interestingly too, despite long and often repeatedly disappointing interactions with local level officials 
and service providers, poor and excluded groups still retained high expectations of government 
authorities (especially village level officials). Several common reasons for this sentiment emerged 
across many of the study sites. First, expectations towards the state are likely to be in part the legacy of 
centuries of feudal rule, and the 1960-1990 Panchayat system where state-citizen relations were based 
on extreme dependence and fear, where questioning civil servants, let alone demanding change, was 
unimaginable. In complying with social and political hierarchies, the powerless nevertheless expect 
that the powerful will provide some assistance through ruler largesse (Lawotti, 2005) and in this way 
paternalistic attitudes and traditions are perpetuated. Remnants of feudal subject identities could be 
detected in the disjuncture between focus group discussants’ insightful analyses of community needs 
and clear suggestions for improvements, and an absence of efforts to articulate these demands to 
officials or service providers.30  This is was no doubt partly influenced by the relative dearth of 
mechanisms, despite the presence of the Local Self-Governance Act, to channel public participation in 
policy processes. This was highlighted by the fact that for many focus group participants involvement 
in this participatory governance assessment was a novel experience. Indeed, as discussed above, local 
elections have frequently been disrupted or delegitimized through conflict and low participation.  
 
For many poor and excluded groups, the state is also the only provider they are aware of – the presence 
of NGOs and donor organisations was surprisingly limited in most of the study communities and what 
limited experiences participants had had with non-state actors had been relatively short-term (see Box 
5 below). A number of focus group discussions highlighted the problems of donor and NGO projects 
having been discontinued with inadequate advance warning and communication as to why. This is no 
doubt linked in part to the serious security problems in rural Nepal over the last decade but perhaps 
also a function of the relatively short-term project cycles of the majority of donor and NGO projects and 
the fact that their presence is often limited to the capital and provincial capitals.    
 
3.2  Blockages  
 
An important part of this participatory governance assessment entailed asking focus group participants 
to pinpoint problems with their interactions with government agencies and public service providers. 
Interestingly many communities identified both supply side and demand side blockages.  
 
On the supply side key concerns included the following:   
 
3.2.1 Corruption and patrimonialism 
Corruption and patrimonialism appeared to be deeply entrenched in almost all VDCs where our study 
communities were located (with the exception of the Chepang in Makwanpur perhaps because they are 
                                                          
30 It is important to note that many of the officials with whom the poor interact are also dependent on the operation of a much 
larger (and still very feudal) system of fund and authority flows.  Some of course would be able to do a lot more than they do to 
respond to local needs. 
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widely viewed as one of the most isolated and ‘backward’ communities in the country). In order to 
process routine applications for e.g. birth, marriage or death registrations, land title etc. VDC and DDC 
officials would commonly ask for small bribes. Many focus group participants spoke animatedly about 
the cultural codes of bribe taking involving particular body language and gestures, underscoring the 
extent to which such behavioural patterns are embedded in civil service culture. Obtaining basic 
services from vets, agriculture extension workers, the police or health workers to carry out home visits 
also frequently necessitated small bribes to ensure action. Perhaps the only government agents to be 
spared such accusations across all communities were the female community health volunteers, many 
of whom were from the community itself, perhaps signalling an important ingredient of accountability – 
proximity to stakeholders. Although there were few examples of active resistance among focus group 
participants, this was a source of considerable frustration and ending petty corruption emerged as one 
of the most important and frequently cited demands.    
 
3.2.2 Limited information flows 
The lack of access to timely information about public services, legal entitlements, targeted 
development programmes and public meetings was the second most significant blockage identified. 
Poor and excluded groups did not lack interest in state provided services and programmes but too 
often felt that they had been left out of information flows and consultation processes. Examples 
included a lack of information about; 
 
 
• the eligibility criteria and details of school scholarships for girls and Dalits 
• their children’s school performance  
• new seed varieties, pesticides, fertilisers and irrigation technologies 
• the establishment of new community user groups and related benefits  
• the eligibility criteria for targeted development programmes and  
• the decision-making process behind the VDC budget allocation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5: Interacting with non-state actors  
 
Particularly in remote rural villages, but also in urban squatter communities, the presence as well as 
perceived importance of non-state actors was notably limited.  
 
NGOs: In contrast o the large number of NGO and INGO offices that field researchers encountered in district 
headquarters, NGOs were operational in only a handful of the study sites and even where they were active it 
was typically to address just a single issue. In Jumla KIRDARC was providing non-formal adult education 
classes and some childcare services, in Aacham the Dalit community had been able to avail themselves of a 
skills training programme by the Social Empowerment and Building Accessibility Centre (SEBAC), the Dalit 
Women’s Organisation is active in the Kapilbatsu Chamar community and Save the Children US has been 
involved in a drinking water programme in Sirarha. But with the exception of the Dalit Women’s Organisation, 
the benefits provided by these NGOs were not seen to be particularly significant.    
 
Donors: although foreign aid flows have reached 8.9% of GDP in Nepal, their visibility in the eyes of many 
poor and excluded groups is limited. This is partly due to the fact that most large targeted development 
programmes are not present in all districts and in the districts in which they are operating VDC coverage is 
only partial. The geographical remoteness of many of our study communities no doubt reduces the likelihood 
of programme coverage even further.  
 
The important exceptions to the low visibility and impact of donors was in the Siraha Tharu community where 
the Poverty Alleviation Fund had provided important income generation opportunities support, and the GTZ-
supported Municipal Development Fund in urban Tanahu, which was providing important city infrastructure 
improvements. Although several programmes were working in other communities, they were either just at the 
group formation stage, or perceived to provide too limited loan amounts with unrealistically short payback 
schedules, involved user fees which were beyond the financial capacity of the very poor and/or necessitated 
unfeasible time investments.  
  
The private sector: the private sector was perhaps the least visible of all non-state actors to poor and 
excluded groups. Although several return labour migrants identified industrial or construction jobs as an 
important area to address, most focus group discussants who listed employment opportunities as a priority, 
either referred to employment creation as the state’s responsibility or were interested in self-employment 
options.  
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There is a strong sense that local elites control access to information in order to maintain their 
positions of power. This was reinforced by the fact that over half of the focus groups were unable to 
identify a single broker of information in their community. As we discuss further below, although some 
participants were aware that information is sometimes posted outside the VDC or DDC office, this was 
seen to be of limited use as most people visited the VDC or DDC office infrequently and moreover, many 
were illiterate and tended to only seek out the help of a better educated companion when they 
calculated that the benefit they might obtain from the VDC or DDC office would outweigh the transport 
and snack costs they typically need to cover when soliciting the help of a more knowledgeable 
interlocutor.  
 
3.2.3 Lack of opportunities for consultation 
A related point refers to a perception that local and especially national government officials do not 
make adequate efforts to consult ordinary villagers about their views and priorities. Although a number 
of people were reluctant to participate regularly in community user groups due to time constraints, 
there was nevertheless a general sense that officials seldom invested the time to consult with villages 
about their development needs. Visiting VDC or DDC headquarters often involved a considerable outlay 
of time and finances for villagers in remote rural locales, but was often the only hope of communicating 
with local authorities. Among those who did make the effort to articulate their concerns, there were 
widespread complaints that officials did not take the voices of the ‘poor’, ‘illiterate’, ‘Madeshis’, 
‘uneducated women’, ‘untouchables’ seriously. Respondents felt that some officials were openly rude 
and dismissive, whereas others just offered ‘false promises’.   
 
3.2.4 Elite capture of community user groups 
Although Nepal has more than 400,000 user groups which have been established to increase 
community involvement in natural resource management and the delivery of basic services (GSEA, 
2005), their presence was far from ubiquitous in the communities in this study, indicating that 
decision-making power had been captured by a minority. Community forestry groups were present in 5 
communities, women’s savings and credit groups in 6, drinking water groups in 3, and school 
management committees in 7 of the 21 communities visited. Although local health services are also 
supposed to be governed by a community user committee, we did not encounter a single locale where 
such committees were operational. More importantly, only a minority of focus group discussants were 
involved in groups where they did exist, with women in particular complaining that quotas for women’s 
representation were frequently not honoured. Among community user group members, especially 
Dalits, a common complaint was that their involvement was often tokenistic and unless they fought for 
it, they were seldom appointed to decision-making positions. 
 
3.2.5 Human rights abuses by government security forces and police 
Many communities complained bitterly about the harassment, intimidation and violence they had 
suffered at the hands of government security forces and in some case the police during the conflict. 
Although many had also suffered from Maoist intimidation and violence, feelings towards the Maoist 
occupiers tended to be more ambiguous and in a number of communities relatively positive. This 
perhaps explains why the police and armed forces were identified by comparatively few focus group 
discussions as important state agencies in their lives, and several groups spoke vehemently about 
wanting the police ‘as far away as possible’. Indeed there was a sense that in some communities that 
police presence did not contribute to local justice and security, but rather undermined it. Overall this 
suggests that considerable public confidence building efforts will be critical to overcome these 
negative memories.  
 
On the demand side, many focus group discussants identified the following demand side constraints:  
 
3.2.6 Lack of knowledge about how and where to place demands 
Many poor and excluded groups were acutely aware of the barriers that their own illiteracy and lack of 
awareness about government procedures represented in securing better public services and treatment 
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from officials. A common response to the question whether participants had expressed their concerns 
to the relevant service providers and government officers, especially among women and Dalits, was 
that they did not know how and who might be expected to listen to their requests and where to find 
them. This was in part based on routine experiences of having been passed from official to official 
when visiting the VDC or DDC and often having to return repeatedly before securing an adequate 
response. This is an issue closely tied to the supply-side blockages identified above.  
 
3.2.7 Lack of knowledge about legal rights 
Still relating to supply-side issues, a noticeable concern is a widespread lack of knowledge about 
citizens’ legal rights, including the entitlements to which excluded groups might be eligible. A frequent 
complaint was that ‘no one has taken the time to tell us’, ‘we have never been told’ or ‘the law is not 
meant for the poor or those without social connections’. This goes beyond the problems of 
discriminatory laws or weak law enforcement and is indicative of a more profound sense of lack of 
awareness and lack of confidence that poor people would be able to access legal redress. It also 
reflects the inadequacy of existing informal justice systems.  
   
3.2.8 Community disunity 
 There was also a refreshing degree of honesty about the way in which a lack of community unity had 
impeded collective action efforts to tackle basic community infrastructure and service needs. This 
sentiment was particularly strong among the Chepang and the Gurung who reasoned that intra-group 
divisions had prevented them from getting ahead, and was something that needed to be urgently 
addressed. Poor Terai middle caste and Bahun/Chhetri participants identified cleavages between the 
better educated and better connected within their caste groups who often take advantage of the 
‘simple’ and poor as a key obstacle to improving their quality of life.      
 
3.3 Governance improvements people would value  
 
Although material benefits are without doubt a major concern to the poor and excluded groups in this 
study, the quality of the interaction citizens have with the state also emerged as surprisingly important 
in many focus group discussions. This is a dimension that is no doubt difficult to tackle through 
national policy prescriptions, but is nevertheless critical to address if ordinary citizens are to develop 
the confidence to exercise the citizenship rights and responsibilities necessary in a modern democratic 
state. Participants identified the following changes when asked how their engagement with 
government agencies could be most effectively improved.  
 
3.3.1 Respect 
This challenge is perhaps best captured by the simple fact that so many participants when asked about 
their engagement with the state thought it worth noting when they had been greeted ‘Namaste’ by 
government officials. Dismissive and even rude treatment by civil servants emerged as a relatively 
common experience, especially in the Terai. Poor and excluded groups reported that they often felt 
discouraged from articulating their demands to officials and service providers for fear that they would 
not be listened to or worse. For example, squatter women in Kanchanpur complained that they were 
subject to verbal and sometimes even physical abuse by medical staff during pregnancy checkups. 
Similarly, the Chamar in Kapilbatsu criticised the treatment they received by the police – ‘before 
inquiring about our problem, they first hit and yell at us’. In other cases, they were ignored in the queue 
outside a government office, passed over for ‘higher caste’ and/or better off petitioners. A common 
recommendation across all sites was therefore that all citizens regardless of wealth, education, 
geographical area of origin, caste or ethnicity should be treated equally and with respect by officials – a 
culture of working likely to require a lengthy process of changing deep-seated attitudes.  
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3.3.2 Improved communication and access to information 
In order to ensure that citizens avail themselves of government services and that targeted development 
programmes reach the poorest of the poor, it is critical that information is provided in a timely fashion 
and also communicated in a medium that poor and excluded groups can access. The most popular 
information channels cited by participants were community radio and word of mouth. This suggests 
that government agencies could strengthen state-citizen relations by not only making better use of 
radio public messages, but also investing in more frequent public consultations with citizens. Not all 
citizens were interested or able to participate regularly in community user groups due to time poverty, 
but there was nevertheless a high level of interest in being better informed about government activities, 
village level budget decision-making as well as policy reform processes. In the few wards and villages 
where communities had been invited to public meetings to discuss budget allocations or the 
introduction of a new development programme, this type of outreach was strongly commended.  
 
Such an approach might also be helpful to provide citizens with a basic overview of how and to whom 
they can best articulate various types of demands. Although many participants had clear views on how 
to address local problems, few had communicated these to the concerned officials and nor did there 
seem to be a clear understanding that this—reciprocal communication—was an essential part of 
responsible citizenship.       
 
Language diversity was also identified as an important dimension of better communication. A 
significant number of the study communities were non-Nepali speakers and thus emphasised the 
importance of having access to information in their mother tongue.     
 
3.3.3  Supportive brokers 
Because of the unequal relations between government officials and poor citizens, especially in parts of 
the Terai, brokers of new information and opportunities were identified as particularly important figures 
in the lives of poor and excluded groups. In addition to some supportive VDC and Ward chairs, female 
community health workers and social mobilisers (linked to some targeted development programmes) 
were highly valued because of their role in supporting community interests and alerting people to new 
opportunities. This suggests that investing more in community auxiliary workers could help bridge the 
gap between the state and citizens, and provide a more regular channel of communication and 
information.    
 
3.3.4 Representation in public office 
Recognition of the importance of having one’s community represented in public office was mixed 
among the study participants. Janajati groups seemed to have the clearest understanding of the 
significance of more proportional representation, with both Ranatharu and Magar focus group 
participants referring to historical examples of political representation of their ethnic group under the 
Panchayat Government System that had existed up until the first jana andolan in 1990. Other 
communities were less articulate but nevertheless often attributed their community’s 
underdevelopment to ‘a lack of people like us in government’.   
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4. Vision for the New Nepal  
 
4.1 Sustainable peace 
 
Despite highly diverse experiences during and understandings of the insurgency period among the 
study communities, there was overwhelming support for sustainable peace. The Limbu in Taplejung for 
example stressed that ‘We would be happy to have only half our food – to survive on half-empty 
stomachs – the most important thing is that the peace continues’. There was however a widespread 
cognisance that the peace agreement was a fragile one and thus the emphasis in focus group 
discussions was on lasting peace. Concerns that new tensions—especially regarding the rights of the 
Madeshis—could lead to fresh violence were particularly strong among the Terai middle caste Yadavs, 
the Ranatharu in Kanchanpur and the relatively better off urban Gurung in Tanahu. The Yadav male 
focus group discussants went so far as to warn of possible communal violence given the violent tactics 
employed by the Madeshi People’s Forum.  
 
Particularly in light of the precariousness of the current peace process, an appreciation of poor and 
excluded people’s views of the insurgency period will be critical in shaping a nuanced approach to 
state building in the post-conflict period. On balance, the study communities were probably more 
sympathetic towards the Maoists than the Nepali Army due to their promises of emancipation from 
social and political domination or what women in Pyuthan described as their ‘honey talk’, their 
readiness to talk and eat together with the poor and ‘untouchable’, and their role as mediators 
between poor and excluded groups and wealthy landowners. This more positive view may also be 
related to disappointment in the mainstream political parties that have been in government but failed 
to deliver, and/or shaped by the Maoists recent decision to put down arms and join the interim 
government coalition. It is imperative to emphasise, however, that the experiences were very complex, 
with few common patterns emerging across caste, ethnic or gender lines. In some communities men 
had joined the armed forces, in others the Maoists; in some cases participation had been voluntary, in 
others forced.  
 
Overall, focus group participants were overwhelmingly positive towards the peace process despite the 
fact that few had received specific material benefits or were the recipients of new development 
programmes. The end to the conflict that had been played out in horrifying detail in many of the rural 
study communities constituted a major sea change in many people’s lives and was sufficient reason to 
be optimistic about the New Nepal. Table 6 below maps out the range of positive, neutral and negative 
changes since the peace process, as perceived by the participants.     
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Table 6: Changes since the peace process as perceived by focus group participants 
Positive  
The establishment of a basic security that reduced persistent fears 
An end to the physical and in some cases sexual violence31 perpetrated by the armed forces  
An end to frequent intimidation by both Maoists and the Army, including compulsory participation in midnight 
public rallies (Muslims in Kapilbatsu) 
An end to demands by the Maoists for food, shelter and ‘donations’ 
An end to disrupted schooling for children  
More frequent home visits by international migrants, many of whom had migrated to avoid forced recruitment 
by the armed forces on either side 
Optimism that the Maoists have joined the government and that there is now a chance that political change 
and accelerated development will be possible.  
 
Unchanged 
Interactions with government officials  
Continued control of communal forests in some areas (e.g. Taplejung) by the Maoists  
Presence of development programmes sponsored by gov’t and non-governmental actors  
Land mines in some rural and communal forestry areas  
Maoists continue to patrol forested areas in some districts 
 
Negative  
Rising prices (especially in urban areas)  
Rising levels of alcohol consumption and related family violence, which had been reigned in to some extent by 
the Maoists  
New political tensions and incidences of violence (in the Terai) and a sense that progress has been slow 
Some youths have returned to villages post-conflict, but are struggling to reintegrate and turning to alcohol and 
drugs, resulting in drunken brawls 
 
4.2 Limited knowledge but enthusiasm to participate   
 
Awareness about the political reforms and state restructuring process currently being debated in Nepal 
was generally limited, although significantly higher among men, urban residents and return migrants 
from India. Focus group participants were asked about their knowledge of the definition of democracy, 
the Constituent Assembly and a federal system of government. Many participants had heard all of 
these terms (either by word of mouth or from the radio) and were aware that major changes were or 
likely to take place, but a significant number struggled to recall their meaning and especially the 
potential implications for their own lives. A common refrain in many communities was that ‘no one has 
come to explain this to us’.   
 
Those who did understand the meaning of democracy and the particular nuance of the Nepali term 
‘loktantra’ (rule of the people) tended to be better educated, urban and male. Importantly, among those 
who understood the term, there was a strong sense of support for the current state restructuring and 
political reform process. Janajatis and returnees from India were most familiar with the term 
‘federalism’. Janajatis understood it to be a system of governance where ethnic minorities would be 
given proportional representation and greater political self-autonomy. Return migrants often gave the 
example of the relationship between Delhi and states such as Bihar, and were similarly positive 
towards greater political decentralisation.   
 
Although relatively few communities fully understood the significance of the proposed elections for the 
Constituent Assembly, there was very strong support for elections and eagerness among men and 
                                                          
31 Although our findings revealed some experience of gender-based violence, it is likely that women were exercising a 
considerable degree of self-censorship. In some communities issues were raised by men but not by women, suggesting that 
women fear consequences to their ‘reputation’ if they speak out about such experiences   
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women alike to participate. Whereas most communities estimated that about 60%-70% of their 
community had voted in past elections, many emphasised that 100% would turn out to the polls now, 
especially because of the long lapse of time (8 years) since the previous election. The significant 
exception to this enthusiasm was the Siraha Yadav community and the Tanahu urban Gurung 
community who both emphasised that the Madeshi tensions would need to be resolved before they 
would be willing to vote, given a perceived risk of communal violence following the January 2007 
uprising. The Tanahu Gurung also emphasised the need to improve urban law and order.  
 
4.3 What people are not demanding  
 
It may be as important to listen to the silences and what poor and excluded groups are not saying, as to 
what they are demanding. What appears striking from the focus group discussions on experiences 
during the insurgency, views of the peace process and visions for the New Nepal, is that no one is 
calling for more violence or retaliation for the multitude of injustices that were committed on both 
sides. This reinforces the strong sense of commitment to peace and a desire not to return to a daily 
existence of fear, violence and intimidation.  
 
Similarly there were no calls for transitional justice—to bring the worst perpetrators of human rights 
abuses to trial. In contrast to the NPC/UNDP/UNICEF 2006 study where participants seemed reluctant 
to speak about their experiences during the insurgency, our field researchers did not encounter such 
difficulties and indeed reported detailed accounts of events in many communities. Nevertheless, there 
was a strong sense that although people are not trying to forget or suppress memories of the past, their 
first priority is to get on with their lives, to take advantage of what they hope will be new development 
initiatives and to avoid a return to quotidian disruptions wrought by the conflict. Such attitudes are very 
common in communities that have experienced a high level of suffering during conflict (e.g. northern 
Uganda or Sudan).32   Experience however shows that in order to sustain peace it is critical for the state 
to proceed to restructure rule of law bodies and promote reconciliation initiatives at the local level 
(Hartwell, 2006).  
  
Other reasons for a lack of discussion of transitional justice likely include the widespread sense that 
access to formal justice is out of reach for the poor and excluded, and a recognition that village views 
on the parties involved in the civil conflict are typically divided. Field researchers noted on a number of 
occasions that there seemed to be an unspoken undercurrent in a number of communities that the 
political views espoused in the focus group discussions did not necessarily represent the views of all 
participants. Below the surface tensions such as these and unhappiness about injustice and lack of 
civic and political rights should however be taken seriously as experiences in other post-conflict 
societies suggests that they may later lead to a renewed insurgency (Collier, 1998).  
 
Interestingly too, there were no calls for a return to centralised governance or monarchical rule. Overall 
communities seemed to support greater regional autonomy, albeit with a recognition (especially among 
several Janajati communities) that a strong yet accountable central government would be needed to 
check and balance the power of decentralised governments and prevent excessive political 
fragmentation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 See e.g. Refugee Law Project. 2005. ‘Peace first, justice later: Traditional justice in northern Uganda’. Working paper no. 17. July 
2005. 
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications  
 
Overall the findings of this study suggest that many poor and excluded citizens are optimistic about the 
future following the peace process and are enthusiastic to participate and play a role in the reform 
process. The importance of this on balance positive sentiment should not be underestimated for the 
challenging state building process Nepal is now embarking upon. However, in many countries emerging 
from conflict, governments often fail to capitalise on people’s enthusiasm for peace and to sustain the 
expectations of their citizens about peace dividends, especially in terms of services and accountable 
government structures.33 They may also fail for legitimate reasons such as weak institutional and 
human capacity, high expectations, poor economic performance and distribution, and the presence of 
elite interests against transformation. 
 
There are however a number of important areas to which government and non-governmental actors 
should pay particular attention in order to capitalise on this important window of opportunity. This final 
section of the report highlights these key headline policy messages, and where possible identifies the 
relevant level of government and/or non-state actors best placed to act upon the voices of poor and 
excluded groups in order to strengthen state-citizen relations and governance from below.    
 
5.1 Capitalise on popular support for peace   
 
There is overwhelmingly strong support for sustainable peace among poor and excluded communities, 
notwithstanding their diverse experiences during and views of the decade-long conflict. These groups 
lack, but would appreciate, information on the political reforms under debate (e.g. Constituent 
Assembly, federalism, democratisation). On the other hand, feedback shows that there is insecurity 
from fragile peace agreements in urban areas and the Terai.   
 
Policy implications 
All political parties can capitalise on the strong sense that the cessation of hostilities between the 
Maoists and state security forces is in itself a ‘peace dividend’ that people value deeply, Hence, a focus 
on a united, clearly communicated approach to state restructuring and the creation of a new Nepal is 
necessary. This process requires the provision of information about political reforms and concerted 
civic education efforts by parties and NGOs at the district and village levels in order to meet demand. 
The government can also seek to better understand the sources and perceptions of urban insecurity, 
and invest in appropriate law and order measures.  
 
Finally, there is an indication that the Constituent Assembly of Nepal should publicly recognise the 
social exclusion and political under-representation that Madeshis have historically faced, and devise 
substantial and visible affirmative action measures. In turn, the rationale behind and evidence for the 
importance of these measures should be clearly communicated to the broader public. This message 
should include statistics on the disproportionately low representation of Madeshis in all three 
branches of government (legislature, executive and judiciary).    
 
5.2 Identify and implement quick policy wins   
 
Identifying and implementing quick policy wins is vital to ensure that the enthusiasm for peace 
amongst poor and excluded groups is not eroded. These include:  i) land entitlement (especially in the 
case of Dalits and squatter populations, ii) employment and irrigation (especially in the case of poor 
Bahun/Chhetri and Janajati communities), and iii) infrastructure investment. The deprivations that poor 
and excluded groups face are multiple and overlapping, with no magic bullet that will rapidly improve 
their quality of life.  However, there is a high level of awareness of what the state can do to improve the 
                                                          
33 A peace dividend is defined as the reallocation of spending from military purposes to peacetime purposes, such as basic 
services and social policy programmes. 
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relative position of poor people. This has generated an unrealistically high level of demand for free 
services and facilities across a wide spectrum of sectors, but it is clearly impossible for a least 
developed country in a post-conflict situation to attempt to act on all fronts at once, and it would not be 
good policy to attempt to do so.  
 
Policy implications 
The issue of land redistribution and consolidation— raised particularly by the Terai, Dalit and squatter 
cohorts—is a critical concern. The development and promotion of a high level land reform commission 
with maximum political backing would address these requests, provided political backing is attainable. 
Indeed, while land consolidation is essential for efficient use of water and other resources, it is 
administratively difficult. A process maximising community involvement in brokering exchange deals 
and in resolving the inevitable disputes is therefore necessary to facilitate progress. Furthermore, while 
meaningful land reform will go a long way towards addressing the needs of the poor and excluded, 
particularly in terms of secure tenure of homestead land, it will not alone address the issue of lack of 
livelihood opportunities because per capita land availability is too low, particularly in the hills. Land 
reform will therefore have to be accompanied by measures to provide alternative or supplementary 
livelihood opportunities, including increased value addition to agricultural and other natural resource-
based products. For small and marginal farmers, investment in irrigation facilities as a quid-pro-quo of 
land consolidation is appropriate. If technically feasible, these irrigation facilities should be developed 
in the agriculture land area mostly owned by poor people, otherwise, appropriate farming practices 
(including farming of non-conventional crops) could be demonstrated and supported in order for 
people to have enhanced livelihoods benefit from their limited land. 
 
More generally, there is a need for increased value added and creation of new livelihood opportunities 
in agriculture through forward linkages to markets (and hence livelihood opportunities in grading, 
packaging, transport, etc.) and backward linkages into goods and services for the farm sector (inputs, 
equipment manufacture and supply, machinery servicing and repair, etc.). The employment 
opportunities at local level in the immediate future can be created through skill development to utilise 
the local natural resources to produce various products and services which have local, regional and 
national demand. At the same time, medium term poverty reduction efforts need to include a package 
of support to poor and excluded groups that promote a) livelihood security, b) connectivity, c) access to 
free and nearby services, and d) measures to promote greater equality and respect/ dignity among all 
citizens. 
 
Donor agencies have a huge comparative advantage in terms of infrastructure investment and could 
relatively quickly bring things back to the ante bellum situation. Their assistance in post-conflict 
reconstruction should be mobilised as a matter of urgency. To allow this, government, donor and NGO 
efforts need to be much better coordinated, designed, and based on a clear understanding of district-
specific realities. This includes a clear understanding of the role that donors and NGOs are playing in 
the peacebuilding process as there is a danger of undermining state legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population, as well as the development of its capacity in meeting demands in the longer -term.   
 
A national consultative exercise should therefore take place in order to decide on priorities in all 75 
districts, which in many cases will have to be locality-specific. This exercise should be based on the 
principle of selecting interventions that can maximise impact at minimum resource cost in the shortest 
possible time period.  Rapid impact in a few carefully selected thematic areas could then feed into the 
democratisation process by persuading citizens that the state is actually improving their lives and this 
in turn will help build both trust and experience as a foundation for future development.  
 
5.3 Strengthen meaningful decentralisation  
 
Poor people’s priorities are more likely to reflect the specificities of their local geographical setting than 
to coalesce along gender, caste or ethnic lines. There is also strong support among poor and excluded 
groups for greater political and fiscal decentralisation. These citizens are in favour of greater local level 
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decision-making on a broader range of policy issues as well as budget allocation rights. Most 
importantly, they want to be better informed and more frequently consulted by local government 
officials because a major component of their sense of social exclusion is based on their lack of access 
to information about entitlements, services, opportunities for civic participation, and avenues through 
which to channel demands for change and political reform processes. 
 
Policy implications 
The National Planning Commission’s Three-Year Plan should pay particular attention to mechanisms 
through which the design and implementation of poverty reduction and development policy initiatives 
can involve substantially greater district and village level inputs. In the short to medium-term this is 
likely to necessitate concerted capacity building support for local government human resources that 
will require coordination through the Ministry of Local Development. 
In order to address civic perceptions that local elites control information flows in order to preserve their 
own power, there is an urgent need to strengthen communication channels between government 
officials and service providers, and citizens. Three measures will drive this process forward; firstly, at 
the national level, policy-makers should consider developing a Freedom of Information Act (along with 
the corresponding implementation capacities);34 secondly, at district and village level, authorities 
should make use of community radio—the most popular information source for poor and excluded 
groups—and invest time in more regular face-to-face consultations and public meetings; finally, given 
the popularity of female community volunteers and social mobilisers, greater investment in such 
auxiliary information brokers is another possible option.35    
 
5.4 Provide poor and excluded citizens with the knowledge and tools to   
participate effectively 
 
Despite a large number of community user groups throughout Nepal, participation rates of poor and 
excluded groups, are still wanting. This is largely the case for Dalits and women, particularly regarding 
decision-making roles. Due to Nepal’s monarchical history there is also an additional legacy of poor 
and excluded people strongly identifying themselves as feudal subjects of the rich and powerful which 
continues to shape their worldviews. However, the consultation process underpinning this study 
generated considerable enthusiasm and should be harnessed. 
 
Policy implications 
The introduction of a system of third party accountability of community user groups needs to be 
developed so as to ensure reservations for excluded groups are effectively honoured, possibly 
involving mutual accountability between local governments and user groups. It also points to the need 
to provide capacity building support for poor and illiterate members so that over time they will be able 
to participate on a more equal footing with their relatively better off and educated counterparts. Such 
capacity building support could be financed through the Ministry of Local Development and possibly 
delivered through local NGOs. This support should recognise that in order to capitalise on poor and 
excluded groups’ general enthusiasm to participate, and simultaneously address the information 
constraints that hinder their greater public participation,  citizens need to be provided with the tools/ 
knowledge to participate in order. 
 
In the medium to long-term, a programme of civic education and legal literacy appears to be of critical 
importance. In order to strengthen governance at the grassroots, the poor and excluded need to 
develop more effective citizenship skills, an understanding of their rights, appreciate their 
responsibilities as citizens, and be familiar with the channels through which to articulate their 
demands. What is needed is a longer-term process, supported by community mobilisers, to whom 
                                                          
34 This should build on the useful analysis by Article IX of Nepal’s Right to Information Bill, 2006. 
35 While public meetings may be an excellent way to communication information to villagers, a recent study by the World Bank on 
the  Kecamatan Development Project  in Indoneisa, suggests that they are much less effective than election based methods 
(secret ballot) as a means of choosing among possible village development investments. (Olken, 2007) 
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citizens can turn for advice and support and/or legal advice centres – such as the successful women 
paralegal committees supported by UNICEF in 15 districts and the Chilean system of women’s legal 
advice centres. Again, the enthusiasm to participate suggests that institutionalising a system of 
participatory policy and budget monitoring would be of value to broader state building processes. This 
could be included as part of the Poverty Monitoring and Analysis System (PMAS). 
 
5.5  Ensure that the multi-dimensionality of social exclusion informs all poverty 
alleviation efforts  
This study highlighted the complexity and multi-layered nature of social exclusion, as well as the ways 
in which it exacerbates experiences of deprivation and vulnerability. Tackling social exclusion 
necessitates greater political representation and awareness raising initiatives to tackle societal-level 
discrimination. Improving the outreach of donor and NGO programmes to the poorest and most socially 
excluded is critical not only because there is a limited presence of donors and NGOs in the study 
communities, but also because poor and excluded groups have limited expectations of non-state 
organisations. 
 
Policy implications 
Greater efforts need to be made to ensure that both targeted development initiatives and basic service 
provision reach the poorest and most socially excluded in Nepali society. In this vein, the Nepalese 
government at the national and local levels, with the support of donors and NGOs, should ensure not 
only inclusion of Dalit, Janajati and women, but also geographically isolated communities, poor ‘higher’ 
and middle caste groups, youth and the elderly and religious minorities, especially Muslim 
communities which face multiple exclusions. In other words, officials involved in designing and/or 
implementing poverty reduction policies and programmes need to recognise the complexity of social 
exclusion and linkages with poverty, and could benefit from access to capacity building support. This is 
an area that donors, due to their experiences in diverse contexts, could fruitfully support, provided an 
understanding of the sub-national context is included in this process. This latter point is critical as 
many such initiatives fail to venture further than state capitals and thereby overlook other important 
institutional sites, both formal and informal. With this in mind, support will need to have sustained 
commitment and continuity of personnel.  
 
One response that should be included is recognising that income poverty is an important eligibility 
criterion for development programmes in order to ensure that poor Bahun/Chhetri are not excluded 
from poverty alleviation initiatives. Efforts to communicate the rationale behind affirmative action 
measures to address caste, ethnicity and gender-based social exclusion will also be important if the 
government and other development actors are to minimise a sense of resentment among ‘higher caste’ 
groups. In order to effectively address the priorities of excluded groups, more proportional 
representation reflecting the diversity of the Nepali population is clearly called for, as are affirmative 
action measures.36 However, these measures are politically sensitive and may endanger a political 
elite, thereby potentially requiring an alternate funding source. 
 
Despite these needs, an overriding priority is first to remove discrimination that is officially sanctioned, 
either explicitly or implicitly. Political economy analysis is urgently required to identify such legal and 
practical barriers to equitable treatment. This will in turn give the state greater moral authority in 
moving on to address difficult and deep-seated attitudes that lead to discrimination and injustice. This 
process will combine education (of the included as well as the excluded) and improved economic 
empowerment of the groups that presently suffer extreme discrimination. 
 
                                                          
36 See Lawoti (2005) for a thought-provoking discussion of a range of such possibilities in the Nepali context. 
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5.6 Specific areas for further investigation 
 
Although a rapid participatory appraisal such as this participatory governance assessment provides a 
wealth of insights, it also serves to highlight areas necessitating further investigation. These include a 
more detailed understanding of the opportunities and risks posed by India’s border with Nepal (see 
Box 2). An identification of specific examples of good practice in addressing social exclusion and 
poverty in Nepal is required, including a discussion of key ingredients of success. This investigation 
should incorporate an exploration of commonalities and differences among diverse age groups of 
state-citizen relations  as well as examples of effective communication with citizens by local 
government officials. Finally, a better understanding of the possibilities for private sector development 
in Nepal is required in order to complement and improve state-citizen relations. 
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